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SUMMARY 
Cascading failures of interdependent infrastructure networks have become 
increasingly critical as revealed by recent natural disasters and human disruptions. By 
determining how interdependencies both negatively and positively affect the fragility of 
infrastructure systems, it is proposed in this study that one can identify the most critical 
components and links, determine which infrastructure components to reinforce, and 
decrease the time required to regain normal operations of infrastructure systems.  
With aging infrastructure and limited resources, a solution that systematically 
models the interdependencies between infrastructures can highlight areas that would most 
benefit from investment while accounting for the complex relationships between systems. 
There are sixteen critical infrastructure sectors defined by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security: chemicals, commercial facilities, communications, critical 
manufacturing, dams, defense, emergency services, energy, financial services, food and 
agriculture, government facilities, healthcare, information technology, nuclear facilities, 
transportation, and water and wastewater (White House, 2013). Each of these sectors are 
integrally tied to one another – many sectors depend on energy to power operation, the 
agriculture industry is tied to water infrastructure, and each sector must integrate with 
emergency services to prepare for potential emergencies. Interdependent power and 
drinking water infrastructure systems are analyzed in this study, and transportation and 
communication networks are discussed. These systems are analyzed because they are flow-
based and can straightforwardly benefit from the methodology proposed.  
 xv 
Cascading failures, in which disruptions in one network lead to disruptions in 
connected networks, significantly increase the negative impacts of events such as 
blackouts, equipment failures, natural disasters, and organized attacks. For this reason, 
interdependencies are analyzed. Interdependencies are defined as relationships between 
two or more different infrastructure systems.  
This dissertation presents a modeling approach and the accompanying sets of 
algorithms that enable computationally efficient probabilistic modeling of large 
infrastructure systems while considering interdependencies between networks. The 
proposed method creates a computationally tractable, representative Bayesian network of 
the system, with which exact inferences over single-component states in the network of 
interdependent systems are possible. Once the Bayesian network is constructed, inference 
analyses can be performed over a range of component state and hazard event scenarios to 
identify vulnerabilities across the network. 
The model is applied to analyze component criticality within the infrastructure 
systems. Centrality-based and reliability-based component importance measures are 
considered. Centrality-based measures include degree centrality and those based on the 
system topology. Reliability-based measures include risk achievement worth, which define 
the impact of a single component outage on the probability of failure of the entire system.  
The proposed methodology is applied to assess critical water services in the City of 
Atlanta, Georgia, including dependencies of the water distribution system on the power 
distribution network. Outcomes from a recent interdependent outage event and 
performance analyses can be used to validate the model. Repair, replacement, and 
 xvi 
reinforcement of infrastructure components can then be prioritize based on the model. New 
components may be revealed as critical when external dependencies are considered in the 
network of interdependent systems. Therefore, the importance of considering 
interdependencies in critical component identification is analyzed to understand how 
component criticality changes when making repair or investment decisions for 
infrastructure components when external dependencies are taken into account.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Several factors have led to the necessity of addressing the resilience of America’s 
interdependent infrastructure: (1) aging and antiquated infrastructure systems, (2) an 
increase in the risk of natural and anthropogenic hazards, and (3) an increase in effects of 
cascading failures. Critical infrastructure is defined as “a network of independent, mostly 
privately-owned, manmade systems and processes that function collaboratively and 
synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of essential goods and services” 
(PCCIP, 1997). Several of these critical infrastructure systems are power, water, natural 
gas, communication, fuel, and transportation networks; each of which are inherently tied 
to each other through interdependencies. Interdependencies refer to relationships between 
two or more different infrastructure systems. Section 3.5 further defines interdependencies 
and the specific relationships between infrastructure systems that are investigated. 
Infrastructure in the United States is aging. Many infrastructure components are at 
or near the end of their useful lives, including numerous drinking water pipes that were 
installed in the early to mid-20 century and were expected to last up to 100 years. An 
estimated 240,000 water main breaks occur annually and between 14-18% of water is 
estimated to be lost daily due to leaky pipes. Some parts of the electric grid were built 
before the turn of the 20 century and many transmission and distribution lines were 
constructed in the mid-20 century with expected useful lives of 50 years (American 
Society of Civil Engineers, 2017). Financial restraints and a lack of available components 
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render the magnitude of necessary repairs infeasible. For example, in 2010, the power 
transformer manufacturers in the United States met approximately 15% of the demand for 
power transformers in the country. The lead time between ordering a transformer and 
receiving it ranged from five to twelve months (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014) as many 
of the transformer components are imported from China and Europe. In an emergency 
situation, it is not feasible to get multiple power transformers to a location to quickly bring 
facilities back online. 
With population growth and rapid urbanization, vulnerability and exposure to 
disasters is increasing because more people and assets are in areas of high risk (UNIDSR, 
WMO, 2012). More people are living in areas with high earthquake and flood risk. 
Additionally, cyber adversaries are advancing in capability and are creating an increased 
threat to information systems that all infrastructure systems rely on. Cyber-attacks, such as 
SYNful Knock in 2015, have allowed cyber adversaries access to infrastructure operator 
credentials, and therefore access to control infrastructure devices. This can allow 
adversaries to control the network infrastructure, redirect traffic, and cause damage to and 
large outages in infrastructure systems (United States - Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team, 2016). These phenomena reveal the necessity to focus on resilience – “the ability to 
prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from 
disruptions” (White House, 2013) – through preparation before a hazard occurs, effective 
response during a hazard, and rapid recovery after a hazard occurs. 
Catastrophic consequences of events such as hurricanes Katrina in 2005, Sandy in 
2012, and Harvey in 2017 and the Haiti and Tohuku earthquakes in 2010 and 2011, 
respectively, have demonstrated the impact that these hazards can have on infrastructure 
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systems. Hurricane Sandy, for example, caused power outages for close to two million 
people, damage to nearly 800 buildings, a gasoline shortage, closure of six hospitals, 
internet, cable, and cell phone outages for up to 11 days, flooding of all six subway tunnels 
connecting Brooklyn and Manhattan, interruption to commutes of 217,000 vehicles, over 
500 miles of damaged roads, and release of partially treated or untreated sewage from 10 
of 14 wastewater treatment plants in New York alone (PlaNYC, 2013). Many of these 
outages were due to or exacerbated by the power outages that occurred, displaying a 
cascading failure throughout many infrastructure sectors. Another example of a cascading 
failure is the 2003 Northeast blackout, the cause of which was a tree coming in contact 
with power lines, which led to overloads and outages throughout the power grid in the 
Northeastern United States and Ontario, Canada (Andersson et al., 2003). The cascading 
effects were disruptions of the drinking water, transportation, and communication networks 
because of their dependence on the power network (Hernandez-Fajardo & Dueñas-Osorio, 
2013). To mitigate this problem for future hazards, system reinforcement and recovery for 
resilience must be conducted with a focus on the connections and interdependencies that 
exist between infrastructure systems. 
The methodology and framework proposed in this study have been developed to 
address each of these concerns. The methodology can be used to help infrastructure system 
owners and decision makers prioritize repairs and replacements of aging components, 
understand potential impacts of hazards to reinforce systems and decrease effects of those 
hazards, and identify potential points of cascading failures to prevent their occurrence. All 
of this can be done in a computationally efficient manner without making approximating 
assumptions about the states of components. The model accounts for all connections and 
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relationships between infrastructure components when performing inference. The model is 
made using a Bayesian network (BN), which accounts for uncertainty and allows for 
component-level updates to propagate across the network. 
1.2 Outline 
The remainder of this dissertation is as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides the background for the proposed methods for interdependent 
infrastructure system modeling and analysis. The chapter starts with an analysis of existing 
methods for modeling interdependent infrastructure systems. Then the definition and 
applications of BNs are discussed, followed by existing component importance measures. 
Finally, resilience is introduced. 
Chapter 3 introduces the novel methodology proposed to create a model of 
interdependent infrastructure systems. Each step is discussed thoroughly, including the 
model inputs, dimensionality reduction to allow computationally tractable inferences, 
definition of interdependencies to account for complex relationships between infrastructure 
systems, construction of the adjacency matrix to define the BN structure, discussion of 
cycles that arise in the formulation of the BN, and definition of conditional probability 
tables that define the probabilities of components being in each possible state.  
Chapter 4 evaluates the application of the methodology to an example water 
distribution system and its dependencies on power distribution in Atlanta, Georgia. Each 
step of the methodology proposed Chapter 3 is described in the application. The time taken 
to run several steps of the methodology are also discussed. 
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Chapter 5 presents the application of the methodology to perform inference and 
identify critical components in the network. The different applications are presented, 
followed by a discussion of the component importance measures that are used in the 
application described in Chapter 4. Two component importance measures combining two 
previously defined metrics are proposed. Finally, the component rankings are discussed 
along with their application to increasing infrastructure system resilience.  
Chapter 6 provides an evaluation of the performance of the proposed methodology. 
A comparison is performed to an existing method to model infrastructure systems and a 
comparison of the results is provided. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the main contributions of this work. Potential further 
applications of this work are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 
2.1  Introduction 
 This chapter provides the background for the proposed methodology for modeling 
infrastructure networks and the interdependencies between them. The chapter contains a 
review of methods to model interdependent infrastructure networks, and a definition of 
BNs and their applications. This is followed by a discussion of existing component 
importance measures and their applications to infrastructure systems. Finally, resilience is 
defined and its application to the proposed model is discussed. 
2.2 Interdependent Infrastructure Networks 
Interdependencies refer to relationships between two or more different infrastructure 
systems, such as between power and natural gas or water and power. Natural gas supplies 
generation capacity to power plants and power supplies the electricity needed to operate 
water treatment plants and pump stations. 
2.2.1 Existing Methods to Define Interdependencies 
One study proposing interdependency types was performed by Rinaldi, Peerenboom, 
and Kelly (2001). The authors define four types of interdependencies: physical, cyber, 
geographic, and logical. Physical interdependency refers to a physical linkage between the 
inputs and outputs of two infrastructure systems. An example of a physical 
interdependency refers to a rail network providing coal for fuel to a coal-fired power plant, 
while the rail network relies on electricity from the power plant to operate. Cyber 
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interdependency is defined when the state of a component in one infrastructure system is 
determined based on information transmitted to communication infrastructure. Modern 
infrastructure systems rely on supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems 
and power management units (PMUs) for management and operations, which create a 
cyber interdependency. Geographic interdependencies arise when a local hazard causes 
similar changes to components in close proximity. An example of geographic 
interdependency is the failure of several components in an area due to an explosion or fire. 
Logical interdependencies refer to all other connections between infrastructure systems 
that are not physical, cyber, or geographic. 
2.2.1.1 Limitations of Existing Methods to Define Interdependencies 
To specifically address infrastructure resilience, explicit and comprehensive 
definitions are necessary that relate to all aspects of resilience. The logical interdependency 
defined by Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001) is unclear and would be covered by one 
of the interdependency types defined in Section 3.5 of this dissertation. Additionally, the 
interdependency types defined by Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001) do not relate to 
the post-hazard recovery aspect of infrastructure resilience. In this study, a new type of 
interdependency is proposed – access for repair – which is an important addition for a focus 
on resilient infrastructure systems. Access for repair interdependency is defined in Section 
3.5.3. 
2.2.2 Existing Methods to Model Interdependent Infrastructure Networks  
There are many approaches to modeling interdependencies between critical 
infrastructure systems. These include empirical, agent-based, system dynamics-based, 
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economic theory-based, and network-based approaches (Ouyang, 2014). The method 
proposed in this study is a network-based approach – one where nodes represent different 
infrastructure components and links represent the connections between them. Network-
based approaches are able to analyze system components considering all capacities of 
resilience – resistance, absorption, and restoration. Adaptive capacities are also considered. 
Resistance is the ability for infrastructure systems to prevent and withstand potential 
hazards, prior to the hazard occurring. Absorption refers to lessening the effects of a hazard 
during the event, including taking actions to accelerate decision making in the case of an 
emergency and utilizing system redundancies. Restoration refers to activities to support 
recovery, including community notifications and optimized sequences of response. 
Adaptive capacities include increasing the strength of infrastructures and installing 
monitoring for the states of systems to decrease vulnerability to future disasters. Network-
based approaches are effective at evaluating the ability of the network to prevent events 
that lead to large consequences, determining the effects of improving absorptive capacities 
of critical infrastructure components, and analyzing how well the network supports 
advanced design decisions to quickly find restoration priorities (Ouyang, 2014).  
Previous work in identifying and accounting for interdependencies in infrastructure 
networks include Chou & Tseng (2010) and Halfawy (2008). In Chou & Tseng (2010), 
failure records of different infrastructure types are used to predict interdependencies 
through sequence-based failure events. Halfawy (2008) focuses on how to integrate 
management of multiple municipalities to optimize asset management decisions over 
multiple infrastructure types that may have different owners. Another approach to 
analyzing infrastructure interdependencies is the inoperability input-output model. This 
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model analyzes how disruptions to one infrastructure system propagate to other 
infrastructure systems through the exchange of input and output resources that are 
transferred between systems (Satumtira & Dueñas-Osorio, 2010).  
2.2.2.1 Limitations of Existing Methods to Model Interdependent Infrastructure 
Networks  
Methods to identify and model infrastructure interdependencies, such as those 
proposed by Chou & Tseng (2010) and Halfawy (2008) can be easily integrated into the 
proposed framework. New interdependencies learned or predicted can be added to the 
model through the defined interdependency relationships to assess potential cascading 
failures. The results from the models proposed can be used across infrastructure owners to 
address priorities in investment to mutually benefit multiple infrastructure stakeholders. 
Inoperability input-output models are typically applied to account for economic 
interdependencies between infrastructure systems (Akhtar & Santos, 2013; Santos, et al., 
2014). If desired, nodes representing economic variables can be added to the proposed 
framework, both at the component and system levels.  
While network-based approaches enable identification, description, and analysis of 
most resilience strategies, they can require a large quantity of data input to generate the 
network graph. Prior applications of BNs have typically focused on only one or a few 
systems. In addition, the BN model’s ability for updating – new information entered at any 
node in the BN propagates to all nodes in the network – addresses the limitations of other 
static approaches, such as input-output-based methods proposed by Leontief (1951) and 
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Rose and Miernyk (1989). Static approaches describe the state of a system at one point in 
time rather than allowing for updating as components age and change.  
2.3 Bayesian Networks 
2.3.1 Overview of BNs 
BNs model systems to account for the probabilistic dependencies between 
components and facilitate updating of system assessments with new information. The BN 
is a directed (i.e., edges are directional) and acyclic (i.e., no closed path exists in the 
network) probabilistic graph composed of nodes and links. Based on the dependency 
relationships between components, nodes are defined as parent and children nodes. 
Children depend on the states of their parents. Each node represents a random variable and 
for discrete networks, where components have categorical states, is defined by a 
conditional probability table (CPT). For variables with parent nodes, the CPT consists of 
the conditional probabilities of the states of the child node given the states of the parents. 
For variables without parent nodes, the CPT consists of the marginal probabilities. A BN 
can be updated, meaning that new information entered at any node in the BN propagates 
to all nodes in the network.  
Specifically, the BN framework allows for incorporation of both prior and updating 
information. Prior knowledge about each component is added to the BN during 
construction of the network. When new information is learned about a component, 
including through measurements and observations, it is updated, with the effects 
propagated to all other nodes in the system through inference. For example, if a failing 
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component is replaced, a decrease in that component’s probability of failure is likely to 
decrease the probability of failure of connected components.  
2.3.2 Existing Applications of BNs 
2.3.2.1 BNs in Computing Applications 
In computing applications in civil engineering, BNs have been used in several ways. 
One is to identify damage location on civil structures using E/M impedance (Naidu, Soh, 
& Pagalthivarthi, 2006). In that paper, BNs are used to reduce the amount of input data 
needed for traditional damage identification methods, which require large amounts of 
training data. Cheng & Hoang (2014) probabilistically estimate slope stability using BNs 
to calculate posterior probabilities of slope collapse without requiring prior knowledge of 
data distributions. As in these studies, BNs are useful in the approach described in this 
dissertation because a large amount of input data is not necessary to learn information about 
the network and to calculate probabilities of failure of infrastructure components based on 
different scenarios. 
2.3.2.2 BNs for Single Infrastructure Networks 
BNs have been used to model single infrastructure networks such as inland waterway 
ports (Hosseini & Barker, 2016), railway lines (Castillo, Grande, & Calviño, 2016), 
highways (Grande, Castillo, Mora, & Lo, 2017), power (Tien & Der Kiureghian, 2017) and 
water networks (Leu & Bui, 2016). These studies have not considered interdependencies 
between different networks. In Leu & Bui (2016), the BN nodes are defined based on 
general properties of the water network (e.g., pipe diameter and depth) and other factors 
 12 
that could affect the water network (e.g., pipe corrosion and construction activities). 
Hosseini & Barker (2016) build a BN model where resilience metrics, such as backup 
utility systems and quick evacuation, are nodes in the network. A BN was used to analyze 
the risk of domino effects, similar to cascading failures, in chemical plant infrastructure in 
Khakzad (2015). Nodes represent parts of a fuel storage plant, such as tanks, which can be 
in the states of safe, on fire, or burned out. The cascading failures modeled are in time 
slices, applying a dynamic BN model. Similarly, a dynamic BN was used to evaluate 
cascading effects in the power grid in Codetta-Raiteri, et al. (2012). In that study, electrical 
lines are considered as series or parallel modules that connect nodes in the power grid.  
In general, past studies used BNs to analyze small infrastructure systems of five to 
ten components (e.g., Bobbio et al., 2001; Kim, 2011); the algorithms proposed in this 
dissertation allow BNs to be used for much larger systems of hundreds of components. 
Another application of BNs for infrastructure reliability assessment is in Bensi, Der 
Kiureghian, and Straub (2013), where an efficient modeling algorithm was developed to 
create chain-like BN structures to model infrastructure systems. The BN is modeled using 
survival and failure path chain-like events, where the state of the event depends on the 
states of preceding events in the chain.  Mahadevan, Zhang, and Smith (2001) applied BNs 
to assess the reliability of structural systems accounting for multiple failure sequences and 
correlations between component-level limit states.  
2.3.2.3 BNs for Interdependent Critical Infrastructure 
BNs have also been used to model the security of interdependent critical 
infrastructure (Schaberreiter, Bouvry, Röning, & Khadraoui, 2013). This approach uses 
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service outputs and high-level system measurements as nodes in the network. Aung & 
Watanabe (2010) similarly model interdependent infrastructure systems using BNs at a 
very high level, where each node in the network represents an entire critical infrastructure 
sector. The BN is used to determine cascading effects of infrastructure sector outages. The 
critical infrastructure BN model in Di Giorgio & Liberati (2011) also includes nodes 
representing services supplied and single nodes representing infrastructure systems, e.g., 
the electrical transmission system as a whole, along with nodes representing adverse 
events.  
2.3.3 Limitations of Existing Applications of BNs 
Compared to previous studies using BNs to model infrastructure systems, the focus 
of this study is on large, complex infrastructure networks, accounting for the states of 
individual components of each system. In prior studies where BNs were used to model 
single infrastructure networks, nodes in the BN were used to represent properties of a 
network and other global factors that affect the network. The proposed approach instead 
uses nodes to represent the states of the individual components in the network and links to 
represent the connectivity between them. In infrastructure networks, overall system states 
are governed by individual component states. The methodology in this study enables 
consideration of the states of specific components, whose performance impacts overall 
infrastructure system performance. The resulting model can then be used to analyze diverse 
scenarios, including component-level events, with levels of service outcomes measuring 
resilience of the network under different conditions. Because of computational demands, 
previous BN-based single network approaches have not considered interdependencies 
between the networks they are modeling and other networks on which they depend. 
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Previous studies modeling security of interdependent infrastructure systems using 
BNs differ from the framework proposed in that rather than modeling, as single nodes, 
entire infrastructure systems or just the services provided, the proposed approach models 
infrastructures starting from the constituent components of a system. This dissertation 
considers both the level of the individual infrastructure components and the topology and 
connectivity characteristics of infrastructure networks. In practice, this is where the 
complex relationships between systems, including interdependencies between them, arise. 
For example, the probability of being able to provide a service at a distribution component 
is dependent on the number and reliabilities of redundant paths, which are themselves 
composed of other components, to that distribution point. For a water distribution system, 
that probability is also dependent on the reliability of the power components supplying 
electricity for the water treatment plants and pump stations.  
In contrast with previous studies, each node in the proposed BN model represents an 
individual component of an infrastructure network. This enables a user to capture 
component-to-component relationships, as well as incorporate any component-level 
information, such as updates about component states from monitoring or inspection 
information, into system assessments. In addition, decisions for infrastructure systems 
occur at the component level, e.g., which component should have an additional backup, or 
between which components should a redundant path be built. The proposed framework 
supports these component-level inferences. Resulting analyses allow infrastructure owners 
to identify specific nodes, representing individual components, in the network considered 
critical for replacement, repair, or additional buildouts to increase overall system 
performance.  
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The methodology proposed uses a BN-based approach to capture probabilistic 
relationships between components and incorporate both prior information about the 
network and update assessments when new information is learned about the network. Prior 
information is incorporated during construction of the BN. Updating information is 
incorporated during inference of the BN. For example, if it is learned that a certain hazard 
occurs on the system or a certain component fails, the new information is propagated to all 
nodes in the network to calculate updated probabilities across all component and system 
states.  
2.4 Component Importance 
In reliability engineering, component importance measures are used to identify areas 
for prioritized investment in infrastructure networks (Baroud & Barker, 2018). Previous 
work has highlighted the importance of considering interdependencies in vulnerability 
analyses of critical infrastructure systems. Johansson & Hassel (2010) point to functional 
and geographical interdependencies as particularly important. In this study, service 
provision, geographic, and access for repair interdependencies are defined to 
comprehensively capture the connections between infrastructures. Component importance 
measures are explored to prioritize investment in interdependent networks rather than 
single infrastructure systems as in Baroud & Barker (2018). Both functional 
interdependencies, defined as service provision, and geographical interdependencies are 
considered here. In this way, the impacts of considering realistic infrastructure 
interdependencies are accounted for when making decisions on the components to repair, 
replace, or reinforce to improve overall network reliability. For example, components may 
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have low criticality when considering only one infrastructure system, but can have 
cascading effects when considering the interdependent systems.  
What follows is an overview of two broad classes of component importance 
measures – centrality-based and reliability-based metrics – and evaluation of their use for 
critical component identification in infrastructure systems. The use is considered for 
specific infrastructure applications, the background for their selection in this work, and 
limitations of prior studies in the area. In general, centrality metrics consider the layout of 
an infrastructure network, but do not account for reliability of individual components. 
Reliability-based measures include component reliability, but less explicitly include 
network topology.  
2.4.1 Centrality-Based Metrics 
Several deterministic approaches to centrality-based metrics exist, and the following 
metrics which have been used in analysis of infrastructure networks are investigated: 
betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, degree centrality and the number of 
appearances in minimum link sets (MLSs). These metrics are chosen based on the literature 
review and their applicability to particular infrastructure sectors. Degree centrality relates 
to the immediate risk of a node being influenced by the state of the resource flowing 
through the network. For example, a node in a water network with many connections, and 
therefore a high degree, has higher risk of being affected by a contaminant in the water 
network. Previously, minimum cut sets have been used to represent system reliability in 
single networks (Espiritu, Coit, & Prakash, 2007). Here, MLS appearances are used to 
represent component criticality in interdependent networks as they are widely applicable 
 17 
to any flow-based network. The number of appearances in MLSs indicates the number of 
critical paths for which a component is a part to deliver a resource from supply to 
distribution nodes. 
Other metrics, such as betweenness centrality and closeness centrality are also 
commonly applied. Betweenness centrality represents how many shortest paths throughout 
the network contain a node. Closeness centrality represents the speed by which information 
can be exchanged throughout a network (Comfort & Haase, 2006). Table 1 summarizes 
how each metric is calculated (expanded upon in the corresponding sections), the meaning 
of the metric, and the infrastructure sectors to which the suggested metric is to be applied. 
The metrics are further explained, including definitions of variables and rationale for 










Table 1. Summary of centrality-based metrics. 
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2.4.1.1 Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness centrality (𝐶:;) for a node, 𝑖, is defined as the proportion of times the 
shortest paths connecting two nodes in a network include node 𝑖. Betweenness centrality 
is calculated using equation (1), 





where 𝐺 represents all of the nodes in the graph, 𝑛Mc  represents the number of shortest paths 
between nodes 𝑗, and 𝑘 and 𝑛Mc(:) represents the number of shortest paths between nodes 𝑗 
and 𝑘 that contain the node 𝑖 (Crucitti, Latora, & Porta, 2006). Nodes with high 
betweenness centrality tend to contribute to multiple risk paths in the case of cascading 
failures (Stergiopoulos, Kotzanikolaou, Theocharidou, & Gritzalis, 2015).  
Betweenness centrality is typically applied to roadways, railways, and power 
transmission networks. For example, in the power grid, betweenness is a proxy for the 
power transmitted through a substation (Albert, Albert, & Nakarado, 2004). Since nodes 
with high betweenness centrality indicate a higher level of control in the network, it is 
suggested that this metric is applied to interdependent networks communication and power 
systems. When assessing the relevance of different component importance measures for 
critical infrastructure systems, several assumptions made when using betweenness 
centrality make the metrics more appropriate for transportation and power networks 
compared to, e.g., water or gas distribution systems. The first assumption is that the 
resource flowing through the network is assumed to follow one of the shortest paths and 
the second is that, if there are several shortest paths, the probability of choosing each of 
those paths is assumed to be equal (Grubesic, Matisziw, Murray, & Snediker, 2008). For 
water and gas networks, other dynamics must be considered such as hydraulics and 




2.4.1.2 Closeness Centrality 
Closeness centrality is a measure of how near a node is to all other nodes along 
shortest paths in  a network (Crucitti, Latora, & Porta, 2006). Closeness centrality (𝐶:=) for 






where 𝑁 is the number of components in the graph (𝐺) and 𝑑:M is the length of the shortest 
path between nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗.  
Closeness centrality is used as a resilience measure in Omer, Mostashari, and 
Lindemann (2014), where a transportation system is analyzed for resilience and node 
criticality. Closeness centrality is used because it relates to the accessibility of a node 
compared to the rest of the network and resilience is thought of as the ability to access 
nodes that have failed in a hazard. Closeness centrality can also represent the speed by 
which information can be exchanged throughout a network (Comfort & Haase, 2006). For 
this reason, closeness centrality is applicable to networks such as communication where 
speed is necessary in response activities.  
2.4.1.3 Degree Centrality 
Degree centrality of node 𝑖 (𝐶:>) represents the number of edges that are connected 
to a node (Stergiopoulos, Kotzanikolaou, Theocharidou, & Gritzalis, 2015). Equation (3) 







where 𝑁 is the number of nodes in the graph and 𝐜𝐨𝐧 represents the connectivity matrix of 
the network. The entries in 𝐜𝐨𝐧 are equal to one if nodes are connected and zero otherwise 
(Grubesic, Matisziw, Murray, & Snediker, 2008). 
Nodes with high degree centrality represent nodes with high criticality. These are 
nodes that have a higher direct association with other nodes and can indicate that a node is 
a hub in a network (Grubesic, Matisziw, Murray, & Snediker, 2008). As will be later 
shown, this is consistent with the findings in this study, where nodes with a high degree 
are generally supply components or components that distribute resources to many other 
nodes in the network.  
Degree centrality is often treated as one of the most important metrics for evaluating 
the robustness of a network. However, it is not as indicative of component criticality when 
there is a high level of parity in a network. For example, in Grubesic, Matisziw, Murray, 
and Snediker (2008), an internet network is analyzed and the degree centrality ranges from 
2 to 3 for the entire network. This shows very little difference in importance, but other 
metrics show that some nodes are more critical than others. Therefore, degree centrality 




2.4.1.4 Minimum Link Set Appearances 
The number of MLSs in which a node appears (𝐶:?) is viewed as another centrality 
metric. A MLS is a minimum set of components that must survive for a pathway to survive 
between two nodes in a network. MLSs for a given node represent the paths that must be 
functional in order for the node to obtain the resource flowing through the network. The 
number of MLS appearances as a centrality metric for node 𝑖 is calculated using equation 
(4): 
 










where 𝑀M represents each MLS in the network and 𝑛?hR denotes the total number of MLSs 
in the network, obtained from the MLS formulation, discussed in Section 3.4.1. 
It is intuitive that a node that appears in many MLSs is more critical than a node 
appearing in few MLSs since the node is necessary to carry the resource flowing through 
the network from a supply point to a transshipment or distribution node. 
2.4.1.5 Existing Applications of Centrality-Based Metrics 
Dunn and Wilkinson (2013) apply graph-theoretic measures, such as betweenness 
and degree centrality, to a hydraulic model of a water network and find that a combination 
of physically-based and graph-theoretic component importance measures better predicts 
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component criticality than physically-based measures alone. Compared to this work, this 
study assesses the impacts of interdependencies on component importance rather than 
attempting to identify critical components within a single infrastructure network alone. 
Physically-based measures account for either the hydraulic flow through the network or 
the physical relationships between components. Graph-theoretic measures relate to 
centrality-based metrics as discussed in this dissertation. Combination metrics are 
proposed that account for both physically-based measures – risk achievement worth in this 
case – and graph theoretic measures – centrality metrics. 
Stergiopoulos et al. (2015) analyze betweenness centrality, eccentricity, closeness 
centrality, Eigenvector centrality, and degree centrality for their application to risk analysis 
in interdependent infrastructure systems. The study analyzes dependency risk paths and 
calculates the information gain for each of these metrics. Degree centrality and closeness 
centrality are determined to be the most accurate indicators of nodes with high impacts on 
risk in a network. Closeness centrality represents the speed by which information can be 
exchanged throughout a network (Comfort & Haase, 2006). For this reason, closeness 
centrality is applicable to networks such as communication and transportation where speed 
is necessary in response activities. Stergiopoulos et al. (2015) do not consider individual 
component reliabilities in their assessments of criticality, however. However, as individual 
component performance is critical in contributing to overall network reliability, these 
values are considered in calculations of importance. 
Zhang, Miller-Hooks, and Denny (2015) apply graph-theoretic network measures 
on 17 common network structures for transportation systems. The network measures 
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include connectivity measures, such as cyclicity and degree, and accessibility measures, 
such as diameter and betweenness centrality. The common network structures refer to the 
topology of the transportation network and include grid networks, hub and spoke, and 
crossing paths. Cyclicity, average degree, and diameter are used to analyze the resilience 
of transportation networks. The application of degree is analyzed in this study and 
recommend its use for transportation networks. 
Several of these studies have applied centrality-based component importance 
measures to single infrastructure networks without consideration of external dependencies 
(Pinnaka, Yarlgadda, and Çetinkaya, 2015; Zhang, Miller-Hooks, and Denny, 2015). 
However, they provide a basis for the recommendations made for the use of specific 
metrics in certain infrastructure sectors. Stergiopoulos et al. (2015) considers 
interdependencies in their use of centrality-based component importance measures. 
However, the outcome of the study is to indicate critical sectors rather than critical 
components within each network. 
2.4.2 Reliability-Based Metrics 
In contrast to centrality-based measures, reliability-based metrics take into account 
varying reliabilities of individual components in the network. Vesely and Davis (1985) 
discuss two measures of importance to be used for probabilistic risk analyses – risk 
reduction worth (RRW) and risk achievement worth (RAW). These measures can be used 
to prioritize quality and risk assurance programs for plant management and regulation 
(Vesely & Davis, 1985). These metrics are applied as the canonical reliability-based 
measures to assess component criticality. They are calculated using BNs, where the 
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evidence of each component’s outage is input and the change in system failure probability 
can be observed. Espiritu, Coit, and Prakash (2007) apply two complementary metrics to 
RRW and RAW – reliability reduction worth and reliability achievement worth – to 
commonly used electrical configurations in power networks. The metrics are transformed 
for electrical transmission systems to include outage rates for components of the 
transmission system. Reliability reduction worth and reliability achievement worth provide 
a lower and upper limit on component importance, respectively. Because RAW is both the 
lower limit of reliability when ranking component importance and has less parity when 
components have low probability of failure, RAW is suggested for use with all 
infrastructure sectors. Table 2 provides a summary of the reliability-based metrics 










Table 2. Summary of reliability-based metrics. 
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2.4.2.1 Risk Reduction Worth 
Risk reduction worth quantifies how much a particular node can reduce the risk 
level of a network. RRW can be calculated on a ratio scale or an interval scale. RRW on 








 𝑊: = 	P(System	Failure	|	Survival	of	Node	𝑖)
− 	P(System	Failure) 
(6) 
where P(System	Failure	|	Survival	of	Node	𝑖) is the conditional probability of failure of 
the infrastructure system given that node 𝑖 has 100% probability of survival and 
P(System	Failure) is the original probability of failure of the infrastructure system (Vesely 
& Davis, 1985). 
RRW can be used to prioritize component improvements to reduce risk to the 
infrastructure system (Oliveira, Mota De Sá, & Ferreira, 2014). However, RRW can have 
a high degree of parity when components in a network have very low probabilities of 
failure. When this occurs, there is little distinction between the criticality of different 
components. 
2.4.2.2 Risk Achievement Worth 
Risk achievement worth measures the overall increase in risk at the system level if 
a component node has failed. RAW for a node 𝑖 can be calculated on ratio scale (𝑊:) and 






 𝑊: = P(System	Failure) − P(System	Failure	|	Failure	of	Node	𝑖) (8) 
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where	P(System	Failure) is the prior probability of system failure 
P(System	Failure	|	Failure	of	Node	𝑖) is the conditional probability of failure of the 
infrastructure system given that node 𝑖 has 100% probability of failure (Vesely & Davis, 
1985). 
In this study, RAW is calculated on the interval scale. The prior probabilities of 
failure of each component are calculated using the built probabilistic model of the 
infrastructure network. Then, inference is performed by updating the network with 100% 
probability of failure for component node 𝑖. Posterior probabilities of failure for all 
components other than 𝑖 are calculated. Finally, the differences between the prior and 
posterior probabilities of failure for all components are summed. 
RAW is related to maintenance impact on a component because it quantifies the 
worth of restoring a failed component (Vesely & Davis, 1985).  RAW can be used to 
prioritize the most important components for reliability assurance and maintenance 
decisions  (Oliveira, Mota De Sá, & Ferreira, 2014, August). As previously described, 
RAW provides the lower limit of reliability when ranking component importance and 
displays less parity for systems with low component failure probabilities. Therefore, it is 
suggested that RAW is applied to all infrastructure sectors. 
2.4.2.3 Existing Applications of Reliability-Based Metrics 
Reliability-based metrics, including RRW and RAW, have previously been applied 
to single infrastructure systems including power (Volkanovski, Čepin, & Mavko, 2009), 
inland waterways (Baroud, Barker, & Ramirez-Marquez, 2013), and a generalized 
infrastructure network (Barker, Ramirez-Marquez, & Rocco, 2013). Multiple 
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infrastructures are considered in Patterson and Apostolakis (2007), in which RRW and 
RAW are used to identify critical locations across multiple infrastructure systems. Rather 
than identifying critical components in the infrastructures, geographic regions are 
identified as critical. This does not account for the service provision interdependencies 
between multiple infrastructure systems. 
2.5 Impact of Interdependencies 
The individual component importance metrics above have previously been applied 
to single infrastructure networks. Many interdependencies exist within critical 
infrastructure systems, however, which can cause disruptions in key industries, lead to 
billions of dollars in lost productivity, and cause widespread security and reliability 
concerns. Infrastructure dependency connections can cause failures that are not captured 
when modeling infrastructures separately. For example, a water supply component such as 
a pump station depends on power in order to operate. When a power network is considered 
independently of the water system, the power distribution component that supplies the 
pump station may not be considered critical. However, when the water systems are 
considered, the power distribution component’s criticality increases because it can cause a 
cascading failure in the water system. Therefore, this dissertation outlines the investigation 
of the impact of considering external dependencies in identifying critical components in 
infrastructure systems to make and prioritize decisions such as for maintenance and retrofit.  
2.6 Resilience 
Providing a quantitative way to measure the impact of critical infrastructure on 
communities is essential for improving resilience. Some literature regarding the 
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quantification of seismic resilience for communities and infrastructure networks can be 
found in Bruneau et al. (2003), where measures of increased resilience are reduced failure 
probabilities and reduced consequences from failure; Franchin and Cavalieri (2015), in 
which resilience is based on displaced population, road damage, and recovery strategy; and 
Guidotti et al. (2016), where resilience is quantified based on the loss of functionality and 
delay in recovery. 
Baroud, Barker, & Ramirez-Marquez (2014) also discuss costs and interdependent 
impacts of infrastructure network resilience. They have developed a network resilience 
metric that allows decision makers to assess resilience-building decisions after a disruption 
occurs. They optimize the time to network restoration, the time to restore full network 
service, and the total time spent on recovery activities.  
This dissertation proposes methods to model and assess the performance of 
interdependent infrastructure systems under varying scenarios. This is accomplished 
through a probabilistic Bayesian network model, where inference gives updated 
probabilities of failure. This is useful to increase system resilience before a hazard occurs 
to assess where the greatest extent of damage is possible and where to invest resources to 
prevent large outages. The model is useful during a hazard to determine where to disperse 
resources and repair crews to bring the most customers or the most critical customers back 
online as quickly as possible. Finally, the model is useful after a hazard to prioritize 
components for interventions to prevent similar incidents and impacts from occurring again 
in the future. 
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This dissertation also proposes to rank component criticality for interdependent 
infrastructure networks. These rankings can be used to improve the resilience of 
infrastructure systems before, during, and after hazards occur. Before hazards, the 
framework can be used to identify vulnerabilities of the system in day-to-day infrastructure 
operations. During hazards, outages can be input into the model to identify potential 
cascading failures and to dispatch repair workers and resources to areas of the highest 
vulnerability or most critical assets. After a hazard, the model can be used to help determine 
a prioritized order of repair to get the most customers or assets back on line as quickly as 
possible. 
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CHAPTER 3. BAYESIAN NETWORK MODEL OF 
INTERDEPENDENT INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORKS 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed description of the proposed framework to construct 
a BN model of interdependent infrastructure networks, including how the BN is 
constructed with required inputs, component connection models, and interdependency 
definitions within the framework. The approach and the accompanying novel algorithms 
are described, which both address challenges associated with BN modeling of complex 
infrastructure systems. These include algorithms for minimum link set identification in 
infrastructure systems, super-component identification, and modeling different types of 
interdependencies. These also include a method to identify and remove cyclic component 
configurations within the network. The overall methodology creates a computationally 
tractable probabilistic BN model of large infrastructure systems considering 
interdependencies between networks. The BN model can be used to calculate component 
importance measures in the network, and two metrics combining centrality- and reliability-
based metrics are proposed in section 3.9. 
3.2 Overview 
Figure 1 shows a diagram of the overall methodology. To create the interdependent 
infrastructure system model, the methodology begins with inputs of component locations, 
connectivity, types, and failure probabilities. A binary system is considered in this case, 
where components can be in one of two possible states, e.g., failure or survival. Therefore, 
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failure probabilities are defined. The method easily extends to systems of multiple states 
such as those modeling flow capacity. In those cases, probability distributions over possible 
components states would be defined (Tong & Tien, 2017). 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of overall methodology. 
 
The next step is to reduce the dimensionality of the BN by using MLS formulation 
combined with super-component identification. Algorithms to do this in the context of 
infrastructure systems are proposed in section 3.4. Next, the interdependencies are defined 

















































adjacency matrix, identification and removal cycles in the interdependent infrastructure 
network, and definition of conditional probability tables. The resulting model is then used 
to perform exact inference to probabilistically assess the vulnerability of interdependent 
infrastructure networks.  
3.3 Inputs 
The construction of the BN is largely based on geospatial information about the 
interdependent infrastructure networks. It is assumed that any given infrastructure system 
is composed of individual components whose performance contributes to the performance 
of the overall network. The required inputs for the methodology are component locations, 
connectivity, types, and failure probabilities. 
3.3.1 Component Locations 
The first inputs necessary are the locations of all components in the networks. For 
example, for a water distribution network, the locations include coordinates of supply 
components – water treatment plants, pump stations, tanks, and reservoirs – pipe junctions, 
and terminal distribution nodes. The locations provide information on the components that 
provide infrastructure resources or services to specific parts of the community. In addition, 
the methodology accounts for the relation between components and hazards that are 
considered for risk assessments, as most hazards can be described geospatially. For 
example, the distance from an earthquake fault line can be computed based on the 
component locations. Any specification of locations is acceptable as long as the frame of 
reference is the same across the networks and hazards. 
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3.3.2 Component Connectivity 
The component connectivity inputs are expressed as pairs of infrastructure 
components that are connected in an individual network. For example, for a water 
distribution system, the connectivity is provided as a list of the two system components 
that each pipe connects. The connectivity inputs are translated into a connectivity matrix 
with each row and column representing a component. The matrix is composed of ones and 
zeros where a value of one signifies that the component in the row is connected to the 
component in the column and a zero signifies no connection.  
3.3.3 Component Type 
Another input needed is the type of each component. There are three component 
types considered in the methodology, each corresponding with a different physical function 
within an infrastructure system. The first is supply components. These are components that 
generate or output the resource that flows through the network. For example, for a water 
distribution system, the resource is water, and the supply nodes are considered water 
treatment plants, pump stations, tanks, and reservoirs. The second type is distribution 
components. These are endpoints in the network that distribute the infrastructure resource 
to customers or end users. These can also be smaller distribution points such as small 
pumps or power lines for the water and power systems, respectively, which feed to 
individual houses or facilities. The final type is transshipment components. These are 
intersections between several links in the system that are not endpoints in the network. 
These enable the infrastructure resource to be distributed more easily across the network 
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along multiple paths compared to having single flow paths. The component type inputs are 
necessary to define the role of each component within overall system functioning. 
3.3.4 Component Probability of Failure 
The final input is failure probabilities for each component. These can be determined 
from empirical calculations, asset health scores, or estimated probabilities from 
infrastructure owners or other domain-specific experts. An example of empirical 
calculations is to use fragility curves to calculate failure probabilities given a specific 
hazard (González, Dueñas-Osorio, Sánchez-Silva, & Medaglia, 2016). In other cases, 
infrastructure owners calculate failure probabilities for each component, such as those 
corresponding with varying asset health scores.  
If precise failure probability values cannot be determined, relative values can be 
used, particularly if a goal of the analysis is to provide a comparative ranking and 
prioritization of the system components. E.g., a uniform probability of failure can be 
assigned to all nodes in the network and the output allows a comparison across all 
components. These failure probabilities can also be updated when new information is 
learned about the system. For example, if the results of an inspection update the estimated 
probability distribution of the state of the component, that information updates the prior 
failure probability of the component, and through its connections, the distributions of the 




3.4 Dimensionality Reduction 
With these inputs, the dimensionality of the BN is then reduced using both a MLS 
formulation and super-component identification. These approaches make it 
computationally tractable to model systems of hundreds of nodes. 
3.4.1 Minimum Link Set Formulation 
In assessing the performance of a system, a MLS is a minimum set of components 
that are required to be functioning for the system to function. For a physical infrastructure 
system, a MLS includes the components that must be working for a resource, e.g. water, 
power, or gas, to be conveyed from a source node to any other node in the network. If a 
single component in the MLS fails, the MLS fails. For this application, MLSs link supply 
components to transshipment or distribution components. The MLS formulation used 
represents the connectivity of the network but is not based on flow or capacity of the 
network. They map paths through the network to provide infrastructure services to end 
points in communities. This can be done manually for small networks; however, this is 
time consuming for networks of larger than 10 components.  
Complementary to MLSs are minimum cut sets (MCSs). For infrastructure 
networks, a MCS is the minimum set of components that must fail for a resource to fail to 
be conveyed from a source node to any other node in the network. Several algorithms have 
been developed to identify MCSs in networks. One of these algorithms is EG-CUT 
developed by Shin & Koh (1998). This builds a MCS generation tree and backtracks from 
a leaf when it fails to generate a MCS. However, this method does not enumerate MLSs. 
 38 
A robust, efficient algorithm to define the MLSs of the system enables the capturing 
of the functionality of the network while reducing the dimensional complexity of the BN. 
It models the influence of every combination of individual component states on overall 
system performance through the MLSs. Previously, a recursive decomposition algorithm 
was proposed to identify shortest paths in a network (Li & He, 2002). However, this method 
does not scale with the size of the network  (Lim, Song, & Kurtz, 2015). Here, a recursive 
algorithm based on a depth-first search method (Jiang, Bai, Atkin, & Kendall, 2017) is 
proposed in this study. For large infrastructure networks, a cutoff for the maximum size of 
a MLS can be incorporated based on the logic that a resource will not deviate far from the 
shortest path to increase computational efficiency. For example, water will not weave 
through a grid in a network to travel between two points on a single line. In applications 
where circuitous routes are forced (e.g., if valves throughout a cater system are closed), 
these cutoffs can be removed to account for each possible path. 
The recursive MLS identification algorithm presented as Algorithm A is run for 
each pair of supply components and target components, which include all transshipment 
and distribution components in the network. Inputs to the algorithm are the start component 
(𝑆), target component (𝑇), connectivity matrix (𝐜𝐨𝐧), the shortest distance (𝐷R) from any 
supply component to the target component of interest, and a matrix of the physical length 
of all links in the network (𝐋). Unbolded italics denote scalar values; small bolded letters 
denote vectors; capital bolded variables denote matrices. A comparative distance (𝐷=) is 
calculated to create a distance cutoff for the maximum physical distance of the MLS using 
a multiplier (𝑚). In the application example in this dissertation, the cutoff distance is twice 
the shortest distance between the supply and target nodes, i.e., 𝑚 = 2.  
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As the algorithm proceeds, it “visits” an increasing number of components. Several 
variables are created during the recursion of the algorithm. These include a visited vector 
(𝐕𝐢𝐬)×µ of ones and zeros the length of the number of components (𝑁) that represents the 
components that have been visited – one representing an unvisited component and zero 
representing a visited node during the course of the algorithm, a current path (𝐏𝐂) vector 
that represents the path calculated within the recursive algorithm, and a current length 
variable (𝐿=) that represents the length of the current path.  
Algorithm A. MLS identification algorithm. 
Input: 𝑆, 𝑇, 𝐂𝐨𝐧, 𝐷R, 𝐋, 𝑚, 𝐕𝐢𝐬, 𝐏𝐂, 𝐿=  
𝐷O = 𝑚 ∙ 𝐷R  
𝐕𝐢𝐬(𝑆) = 0  
𝐏𝐂 = [𝐏𝐂, 𝑆]  
Add	length	of	link	to	length	of	current	path	𝐿=  
𝐜𝐡 = unvisited	connections	in	𝐜𝐨𝐧  
If	𝑆 = 𝑇 
𝐌𝐋𝐒 = 𝐏𝐂 
 
Else for	each	element	(𝑖)	in	𝐜𝐡: 
𝑆 = 𝐜𝐡(𝑖)  
If	𝐿= > 𝐷=, break  
𝐧𝐞𝐰𝐕𝐢𝐬 = 𝐕𝐢𝐬 
𝐧𝐞𝐰𝐕𝐢𝐬(𝑆) = 0  
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠 = MLSalg(𝑆, 𝑇, 𝐜𝐨𝐧, 𝐧𝐞𝐰𝐕𝐢𝐬, 𝐏𝐂, 𝐿=)	  
 
Variables are defined as:  
• 𝑆 = supply node,  
• 𝑇 = target node,  
• 𝐜𝐨𝐧 = connectivity matrix for the network, 
• 𝐷R = shortest distance from any supply node to the target node,  
• 𝐋 = matrix of link lengths, 
• 𝑚 = multiplier for maximum physical distance of MLS, 
• 𝐕𝐢𝐬 = 1× n vector of visited nodes, initiated as all 1s representing that all nodes 
are unvisited,   
• 𝐏𝐂 = vector of components in the current path of the MLS, initiated as an empty 
vector representing that no nodes are yet included in the path, 
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• 𝐿=  = length of current path, initiated as 0 indicating that the current path length is 
zero, and 
• 𝐜𝐡 = vector of children nodes of 𝑆 found in 𝐂𝐨𝐧 not yet visited. 
In the algorithm, first, a comparative distance (𝐷O) is calculated as a multiplier (𝑚) 
times the shortest distance (𝐷R). Next, the start component (𝑆) is marked as visited in the 
visited vector (𝐕𝐢𝐬). The start component is then added to the current path (𝐏𝐂). Unless the 
current path only contains one node, the length of the link added to the current path is added 
to the current length (𝐿=). The children (𝐜𝐡) variable is defined as the children of the start 
component (𝑆) – found in 𝐜𝐨𝐧 – that have not been visited as found in 𝐕𝐢𝐬. A MLS is 
discovered if the source component is equal to the target component (𝑆	 = 	𝑇) and is 
defined as the current path (𝐏𝐂). If an MLS is not found, the algorithm then cycles through 
each element (𝑖) of the child vector (𝐜𝐡) and sets the child as the source component (𝑆). If 
the current path length (𝐿=) is greater than the cutoff distance (𝐷=), the algorithm moves 
onto the next supply node. Otherwise, new variables are defined to move onto the next 
recursion. The new visited vector is set (𝐧𝐞𝐰𝐕𝐢𝐬) and the new start component is marked 
as visited. Finally, the algorithm calls itself to repeat with the next 𝑆 component until a 
MLS is reached or the algorithm has visited all elements of the 𝐜𝐡 vector.  
3.4.2 Super-Components 
A second method to reduce the dimensionality of the network is in using super-
components (Der Kiureghian & Song, 2008; Tien, 2017), which combine multiple 
components to model them using a representative single node. One way to define a super-
component is as a subset of components in the system that are connected in series or parallel 
(Tien & Der Kiureghian, 2017). These reduce the effective number of nodes in the BN 
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while still representing the state of each node in the system (Bensi, Der Kiureghian, & 
Straub, 2013). Components that comprise the super-component are represented as parents 
of the super-component in the BN, reducing computational complexity of the model 
without making any approximating assumptions. 
For the proposed algorithm, a super-component is defined when its state is known 
given the failure of any one of its constituent components. For this approach, components 
in a series configuration are grouped into a super-component. Those components become 
parents of a super-component node in the BN. The algorithm presented as Algorithm B is 
used to define the super-components using just the connectivity matrix (𝐜𝐨𝐧) and a vector 
of the supply components (𝐬) as inputs. The algorithm is as follows: 
Algorithm B. Super-component identification algorithm. 
Input: 𝐜𝐨𝐧, 𝐬 
For	each	transshipment	and	distribution	component	in	the	network	(𝑖)	 
𝐜 = 𝐜𝐨𝐧(𝑖, ∶) 
If	𝐬	 ∉ 𝐜 and length	of	𝐜 = 2 
For	each	element	of	𝐜	(𝑗) 
If	the	length	of	𝐜𝐨𝐧(𝑗, ∶) = 2	,	super-component identified 
 
The algorithm loops over each non-supply component in the network (𝑖) and 
defines the connection vector (𝐜) as all components indicated in the connectivity matrix 
with one values. Supply components are not included as their functionality differs from 
that of transshipment and distribution components. The algorithm then selects connections 
in 𝐜 that have exactly two connections (length	of	𝐜 = 2), representing a component in 
series. Finally, the algorithm loops through all elements of the connection vector (𝐜) and 
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makes the same selection process to either add components to the current super-component 
or to identify a new super-component.  
3.5 Defining Interdependencies 
In the modeling methodology, three comprehensive interdependency types are 
included – service provision, geographic, and access for repair – that affect the resilience 
of infrastructure systems. These three interdependency types are used because they 
encompass the possible connections between infrastructures through a physical connection, 
connection by geography, and resilience-aspects of interdependence; and are well defined 
compared to previous definitions of interdependencies where a logical interdependency 
represents relationships not covered by other types.  
3.5.1 Service Provision Interdependency 
3.5.1.1 Definition of Service Provision Interdependency 
In the proposed framework, a service provision interdependency refers to the 
function of a component in one system relying on the function of a component from another 
system. This covers both the physical and cyber interdependencies as defined by Rinaldi, 
Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001). An example of this is a water pump station requiring 
electricity from a power substation to function. If there is an outage at the power substation, 




3.5.1.2 Modeling of Service Provision Interdependency 
To model a service provision interdependency, a direct link is added from the 
supplying – parent – component providing the service to the dependent – child – 
component. For example, to model the dependency of a water pump station on power, a 
link is added from the power substation to the water pump station. An assumption made in 
building the BN is that the closest supplying component provides the resource to the 
dependent component (Dueñas-Osorio, Craig, & Goodno, 2007). The ability of the 
supplying component to provide the resource to the dependent component is represented 
in the BN. If other information on how resources are supplied across infrastructure 
networks is available, that information is easily incorporated into the BN through direct 
links between those components. Child components can have multiple parents. For 
example, water treatment plants often have feeds from multiple power substations. In that 
case, each of the substations is represented as a parent node. Components typically 
requiring a service provision interdependency include natural gas and water supply 
components that depend on power. Other components in each of these systems do not 
require power in order to function. For example, gravity-fed water distribution 
components, particularly in older systems, can usually operate without power. As systems 
become increasing automated, however, these service provision interdependencies will 
increase. 
An example BN for a service provision interdependency is shown in Figure 2, 
where the service provision interdependencies are shown as dashed arrows. The example 
BN comprises a power system of components CÈ, …, C,È, where 𝑚 is the number of 
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power components, and a water system of components CÉ, …, C]É, where 𝑛	is the number 
of water components. The MLSs are numbered MLSÈ, …, MLS}È and MLSÉ, …, MLSEÉ, 
where 𝑠 represents the number of MLSs for the power network and 𝑡 represents the number 
of MLSs for the water network. The service provisions interdependencies are from C,È to 
CÊÉ and from CÉ to C(,Ë)È. The relationship from C,È to CÊÉ can represent the 
dependence of a water pump station on a power distribution station, as in the above 
example. The relationship from CÉ to C(,Ë)È can represent a power plant depending on 
water from a water distribution station. 
 
Figure 2. Example BN for service provision interdependency. 
 
3.5.2 Geographic Interdependency 
3.5.2.1 Definition of Geographic Interdependency 
A geographic interdependency refers to the relationship between two or more 
components in the same geographic area that are likely to experience similar effects given 
a local hazard. This interdependency type is consistent with the geographic 
interdependency defined by Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001). For example, 


















area. It is common for gas and water lines to be routed along the same road so that only 
one trench is necessary; this represents a geographic interdependency where the two lines 
are more likely to fail together given a common hazard. Collocated components are also 
likely to be repaired together during the restoration process. 
3.5.2.2 Modeling of Geographic Interdependency 
To model a geographic interdependency, components are grouped into hazard 
zones. For each zone, a common hazard node is added, which is a parent of all of the 
components in the zone. Hazard nodes can be created for any set of components to capture 
multiple hazard impacts. These include cyber nodes that represent cyber threats on 
infrastructure systems, and natural disaster nodes representing earthquake or hurricane 
threats. Zones can be determined based on proximity to certain hazards, collocation of 
components, or service areas around supply components. An example using proximity to 
a hazard would be to partition components based on their distance from an earthquake fault 
line. An example to partition the components using service areas is to use a k-nearest 
neighbor search to group components by their closest supply nodes. 
Figure 3 shows an example BN for a geographic interdependency, where the dashed 
lines represent the geographic interdependencies. Hazard zones are represented by 
Hazardto Hazard}, where 𝑠 denotes the number of hazard zones. Components with the 
same hazard parents are in the same hazard zone. In the example, components CÈ, CÉ, 




Figure 3. Example BN for geographic interdependency. 
 
System nodes can also be created based on the geographic partitions that represent 
the resources provided to particular service areas when performing inference on the system. 
Each system node is a child of all of the components within that system, such as those 
within a geographic partition. 
3.5.3 Access for Repair 
3.5.3.1 Definition of Access for Repair Interdependency 
An access for repair interdependency is defined for certain infrastructures that must 
be functioning to gain cyber or physical access to a failed component to repair it. For 
example, if a water network component loses function, communication systems will be 
necessary to report the failure or gather information about the event through monitoring 
systems. Transportation systems must also be working for repair crews to access the failed 
component. This interdependency type is proposed specifically to address infrastructure 
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Rather than the undefined logical interdependency type listed by Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and 
Kelly (2001), three explicit interdependency types of service provision, geographic, and 
access for repair are applied in this methodology, which represent the possible connections 
that exist between infrastructure systems. 
3.5.3.2 Modeling of Access for Repair Interdependency 
When modeling an access for repair interdependency, the change in the operational 
status of infrastructure components over time is taken into account. Access nodes are 
created as parent nodes of the components that depend on them. Access nodes only affect 
the state of a child component in the case of component failure. Generally, a working 
component is independent, for example, of the state of its connected communication or 
transportation networks. Communication systems are used to provide information on the 
functioning of components to operators, however, this will not affect a component’s 
survival or failure. Therefore, a node representing the state of the component in its previous 
time step is created, allowing the determination of the need to account for the state of an 
access node. In defining the access nodes, for cyber access, these nodes account for 
required communication with the dependent component and the robustness of the 
communication channels to disruptions. For physical access, the access nodes represent 
remoteness and redundancy in transportation paths to reach the component. The probability 
of repair of a component given access can be defined based on the criticality of component 
or the availability of resources for repair. Probability of repair may evolve over time. For 
example, if everything is operating normally, the probability of failure may be 100% as the 
infrastructure decision makers may have all of the resources needed to repair a failed 
component on hand. However, if a hazard has occurred, probabilities of repair will vary 
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based on the criticality and accessibility of components. In this case, the probability of 
repair can be updated and input into the BN. Inference using the proposed methodology 
takes approximately four seconds on a network with 119 components. 
An example BN is shown in Figure 4 with	CÉ as the potentially failed node and 
the access nodes defined as a telecommunications tower and road providing cyber and 
physical access, respectively. CÉ	ÈÏÐÑÒÓÔÕ represents the state of the water node in the 
previous time step. 
 
 
Figure 4. Example BN for access for repair interdependency. 
 
3.6 Interdependent Adjacency Matrix Construction 
The structure of a BN is defined by an adjacency matrix. This is similar to a 
connectivity matrix where it is composed of ones and zeros. Here, a value of one indicates 
the connection between a parent node in the row and a child node in the column and zero 
indicates no connection. In addition, rather than just capturing the original network 












defined MLSs, super-components, and interdependency relationships. The adjacency 
matrix also accounts for directionality of the dependency and is no longer symmetric. The 
adjacency matrix is constructed based on the parent-child relationships defined in the 
previous steps. For MLSs in particular, each component that comprises an MLS is a parent 
of the MLS node, and each MLS node is a parent of the component for which it is an MLS 
to provide the resource to that component. This functional relationship introduces potential 
cycles in the graph. The method to address these cycles is presented in the following 
section.  
3.7 Accounting for Cycles 
In the modeling and assessment of complex infrastructure systems, it is possible for 
cycles to arise in the creation of the BN graph. For example, suppose component C1 in the 
water network, denoted CÉ, is a part of a MLS for component CµÉ. Suppose at the same 
time that, based on the topology of the network, CµÉ is a part of a MLS for component 
CÉ. With these two components each a part of the other’s MLSs, a cycle is introduced. 
BNs, however, must be acyclic graphs. Typically, the system would no longer be able to 
be modeled as a BN. Here, a novel algorithm has been developed as a method to identify 
and remove the cycles in the BN, discussed in the following, and account for the 
dependency that the cycle introduces, discussed in Section 3.8.5.2. 
An example of a cycle that arises from the MLS formulation is shown in Figure 5, 
where component C is part of the MLS (MLSÊ) for CÊ and CÊ is included in the MLS 
(MLS) for C. A method to remove the cycles in the graph while retaining the dependency 
relationships between the nodes is presented. Specifically, the components are defined by 
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their joint probability distribution and with a removal of any one of the links from a 
component to a MLS within the cycle, thus removing the cycle. In the example, the link 
from C to MLSÊ	is removed, shown with the dotted line. The joint probabilities are 
calculated by considering the possible configurations of each component state and using 
total probability to calculate the remaining values. If all components comprising MLSÊ are 
functional, the state of MLSÊ then depends on the state of C. The probability of failure of 
C is then calculated using the probabilities of failure of its parents. This calculation is 
further described in Algorithm C presented later in this section to define the MLS 
conditional probability tables. 
 
 
Figure 5. Example BN with cyclic dependency. 
 
In this step, all cycles in the graph must be identified. This is performed by 
traversing the graph represented by the interdependent adjacency matrix and identifying 
when the path traversed reaches a previously visited node. This represents a cycle in the 
C1 C2
MLS1 MLS2
Ci Cj… Cm Cn…
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graph. Once the cycle is identified, a link from a component to a MLS node is removed in 
the adjacency matrix.  
When traversing the graph, the process begins with component CÒ. A visited vector 
is constructed as [CÒ]. The graph traverse algorithm then moves to CÒ’s connections, in this 
case MLS. The visited vector is now [CÒ, MLS]. This continues, traversing to each 
connection until the visited vector reaches [CÒ, MLS, C, MLSÊ, CÊ, MLS]. In this step, a 
node in the visited vector is repeated, indicating a cycle. At this step, a link is removed in 
the adjacency matrix, in this case the link from C to MLSÊ, by setting that entry to zero. 
The removed link is noted to define the conditional probability distribution in the next step. 
3.8 Defining Conditional Probability Tables 
Each node in the BN must be defined by a conditional probability distribution of 
its state given the states of its parents, typically represented for discrete or discretized 
variables in a CPT. The calculation of the CPT varies for each node type. Details for the 
CPT calculation for nodes defining geographic interdependencies, access for repair 
interdependencies, supply components including service provision interdependencies, 
transshipment and distribution components, and MLSs both non-cyclic and cyclic are 
provided in this section. 
3.8.1 Geographic Interdependency Nodes 
When defining the geographic interdependency in the network, hazard nodes are 
created that represent components in the same physical area that are likely to experience 
correlated outcomes in the case of a hazard. Hazard nodes do not have parent nodes, so 
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their CPTs are defined as the marginal probabilities of hazard occurrence, as shown in 
equation (9), where 𝐻:, 𝑖 = 1, …, 𝑛b, represents a hazard node and 𝑛b is the number of 
hazard zones. The probability of occurrence of hazard 𝐻: is 𝑝b^ . 
 P(𝐻:	occurs) = 𝑝b^	
P(𝐻:	does	not	occur) = 1 − 𝑝b^	
(9) 
To assess overall performance of the infrastructure systems, zone nodes can be 
incorporated to account for levels of service provided in each service area in the 
community. Zone nodes represent these service areas, with the parents of zone nodes 
including all of the nodes within the zone. Equation (10) defines one example of a 
calculation of CPTs for zone nodes, where 𝑍M, 𝑗 = 1, …, 𝑛k, represents a zone node and 𝑛k 
is the number of zones. The components within each zone are represented by	𝐂𝐙𝒋
𝒌 , 𝑘 = 1, 
…, 𝑛kl where 𝑛kl is the number of components in zone 𝑍M. In equation (10), the percent 
level of service is denoted as 𝐿𝑂𝑆. A zone’s level of service is defined as the percentage of 
components that are in the working state within the zone’s partition. A zone node can also 
be defined by the proportion of its customers that have continued service or by the 










3.8.2 Access for Repair Interdependency Nodes 
Access nodes are created when defining access for repair interdependencies. This 
is performed for all supply, transshipment, and distribution components in the networks 
that depend on them for repair. Equation (11) defines a component CPT when it has an 
access node as a parent. The component is denoted 𝐶,, the access node 𝑎𝑐𝑐,, and the 
component’s state in the previous time step 𝐶,	@ABC. The probability of failure of 
component 𝐶, is	𝑝ov . The probability of repairing component 𝐶, is defined as 𝑝AB@5:Av , 























3.8.3 Supply Components 
In defining CPTs for supply components, the parent nodes of supply components 
typically include hazard nodes and service provision interdependency nodes. Equation (12) 
represents the CPT formulation for supply nodes. The supply node is denoted 𝑆~ , 𝑞 = 1, 
…, 𝑛R, where 𝑛R is the number of supply nodes. The conditional probabilities of component 
failure given that a hazard occurs and does not occur are represented as 𝑝ow|qrs and 
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𝑝ow|tu	qrs, respectively. The hazard node of which the supply component is a child is 























3.8.4 Transshipment and Distribution Components 
Transshipment and distribution components have MLSs and hazard nodes as 
parents. Equation (13) shows the CPT formulation for these transshipment and distribution 
components. The components are represented by the variable 𝐶E, 𝑡 = 1, …, 𝑛W, where 𝑛W 
is the number of non-supply components. The MLSs that are parents of the component are 
represented as 𝑀𝐿𝑆WX, 𝑣 = 1, …, 𝑛?, where 𝑛? is the number of MLS parent nodes of 
component 𝐶E. In equation (13), the component is also a child of a single hazard node 
denoted 𝐻:. The conditional probabilities of component failure given that the hazard occurs 


























3.8.5 Minimum Link Set Nodes 
The functioning of an MLS depends on the functioning of the components in the 
MLS. Therefore, the parents of the MLS nodes are the components that comprise the MLS. 
However, there are two types of MLSs – those without cyclic links and those with cyclic 
links that have been removed. The formulations for the CPTs for the MLSs in the two cases 
are described below. 
3.8.5.1 Non-Cyclic MLS Nodes 
Equation (14) shows the CPT formulation for MLSs that did not contain cycles, 
and therefore do not contain links that have been removed with the cycle removal 
algorithm. The MLS nodes are denoted 𝑀𝐿𝑆H, 𝑤 = 1, …, 𝑛?ig where 𝑛?ig is the number 
of non-cyclic MLSs. The components comprising the MLS are denoted 𝐂𝐰𝒙 , 𝑥 = 1, …, 𝑛Hj 














3.8.5.2 Cyclic MLS Nodes 
For MLSs containing cycles and therefore links that have been removed during the 
cycle identification process, the defined CPTs for these MLS nodes must account for the 
removed links. This is done using values from the joint probability distribution of the nodes 
for which links have been removed. Let the cyclic MLSs be denoted 𝑀𝐿𝑆5, 𝑎 = 1, …, 𝑛?g 
where 𝑛?g is the number of cyclic MLSs. The components that comprise an MLS are 
denoted 𝐂𝒂𝒃 , 𝑏 = 1, …, 𝑛5[ where 𝑛5[ represents the number of components in 𝑀𝐿𝑆5. The 
removed links for each MLS are represented in 𝐋𝐫𝐞𝐦, a 𝑦 ×2 matrix where 𝑦 is the number 
of removed links for a specific MLS and each row represents the parent to child link that 
was removed. Each removed link is defined as 𝐋𝐫𝐞𝐦𝒛 , 𝑧 = 1, …, 𝑦. The conditional 
probabilities of failure of components 𝐂𝒂𝒃  given that a hazard occurs and does not occur 
are represented as 𝑝o[|qrs and 𝑝o[|tu	qrs, respectively. The probability of a hazard occurring 
is 𝑝b^ , and the joint probability value calculated for use in the CPT is 𝑝?hR	O{O. The 
probability of failure of the link that is removed is calculated as the product of marginal 
failure probabilities of the parents of 𝐋𝐫𝐞𝐦𝒛 . The algorithm for formulating the CPT for 
MLSs with cyclic links is presented as Algorithm C follows: 
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The definition of joint probability, 𝑝?hR	O{O, scales exponentially. However, with the 
example 112-component network described in 4.2, the calculation of CPTs for the 392 
nodes in the BN takes only one minute. Once the CPTs for all nodes are defined, the BN 
model can be built. 
3.9 Proposed Combination Metrics 
In analyzing methods for assessing component importance, centrality-based 
metrics are useful in that they account for connectivity of a network when calculating 
component criticality. However, they do not consider individual component reliability, 
which affects quantification of the impacts of individual components on overall system 
performance. Therefore, centrality-based metrics should not be used alone to rank 
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component importance. Reliability-based metrics do include component reliability. 
However, they give less weight to the topology of the network compared to the centrality-
based metrics discussed. In assessing component criticality in interdependent infrastructure 
networks, both system-level topology and component-level reliability characteristics are 
important. Therefore, two measures that combine centrality-based and reliability-based 
attributes are proposed.  
 Previously, Cadini, Zio, and Petrescu (2009) proposed four reliability centrality 
measures for network infrastructure and applied these to a power transmission system. The 
measures are reliability degree centrality, reliability closeness centrality, reliability 
betweenness centrality, and reliability closeness centrality. These combine the classical 
definition of the centrality metric with a reliability metric such as edge reliability or path 
reliability. The reliability degree centrality, for example, is calculated by multiplying a 
node’s degree by the reliability of its connected links  (Cadini, Zio, & Petrescu, 2008, 
October). 
Compared to the previous study, this dissertation proposes accounting for 
component reliabilities in the approach. This is due to the importance of individual 
component performance in governing system performance, i.e., the probability of 
providing an infrastructure service at a final distribution point will be dependent on the 
reliabilities of individual component comprising the system. In this study, the importance 
of node 𝑖 is calculated including its reliability with weighting by centrality. The 
combination metric proposed, 𝑊:> , is calculated using equation (15): 
 59 
 𝑊:> = 𝑊: ∙ 𝑤:>  (15) 
where 𝑊:  is RAW and 𝑤:> represents the weight for the component based on its degree.  
The weight used for the combination metric is the normalized degree value plus one and is 
calculated using equation (16). One is added so that the components with a single 
connection will have a weight of one rather than a weight of zero. 
 




A second combination metric is offered (𝑊:?) using MLS appearances and RAW. 
This is calculated using equation (17):  
 𝑊:? = 𝑊: ∙ 𝑤:? (17) 
where 𝑤:? represents the weight for the component based on its number of appearances in 
MLSs defined in the system using Algorithm A. This weight is the normalized number of 
MLS appearances plus one and is calculated using equation (18). 
 
𝑤:? = 1 +
𝐶:? −min	(𝐶?)
max(𝐶?) − min	(𝐶?) 
(18) 
These combined measures enable the accounting for both topological and 
individual component reliability characteristics when assessing component criticality. 
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CHAPTER 4.  APPLICATION EXAMPLE FOR PROPOSED 
FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Introduction 
To demonstrate the proposed framework and approach, it is applied to the 
interdependent water and power distribution networks in Atlanta, Georgia, in this chapter. 
The system is modeled, and inference is performed on the network using the model. The 
chapter includes a description of how each step described in Chapter 3 is applied to the 
example network. The chapter starts with an overview of the system studied, the inputs 
supplied, the dimensionality reduction, and the construction of the BN. The computational 
requirements in terms of memory storage and computation time to run several of these 
steps are included.  
4.2 System Overview 
For the water system, pipes greater than or equal to 18 inches in diameter are 
analyzed. This includes 112 components, seven of which are supply stations and 105 of 
which are transshipment or distribution nodes. There are 244 links, or pipes, in the network. 
For the power system, the power substations that are located at each supply node are 
modeled. Supply nodes have between one and three electrical feeds, varying with each 
supply component.  
Figure 6 shows the system with supply nodes shown as empty circles and distribution 
and transshipment nodes shown as solid points. The supply nodes are also the locations of 
the power components. 
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Figure 6. Atlanta, Georgia water and power distribution systems. 
 
4.3 Inputs 
Inputs include identification numbers and locations of 112 junctions in the water 
network. The start and end junctions and size characteristics of 350 pipes are included. The 
junctions are condensed to represent the start and end junctions of each pipe rather than 
accounting for all on-pipe junctions. 
4.3.1 Component Locations 
The component locations are given as state-plane coordinates. An example of 
locations for two components C1 and C2 is shown in Table 3. 
N





Table 3. Component locations for example system in state-plane coordinates. 
Node Latitude Longitude 
C1 2.2452e6 1.4471e6 
C2 2.1893e6 1.3204e6 
 
4.3.2 Component Connectivity 
The component connectivity for the application is obtained from a list of each link 
in the network used in the hydraulic model of the system. Table 4 is an excerpt from this 
list of connections, where the start and end nodes are names of junction components in the 
network.  
 






4.3.3 Component Type 
The component types for the application are defined depending on their function, 
i.e., supply, transshipment, or distribution. The constituent elements of supply nodes, i.e., 




4.3.4 Component Probability of Failure 
For the application, component failure probabilities are assumed to be consistent 
across each component to better assess relative component vulnerabilities. Two levels of 
operation are considered – with occurrence of a hazard and without occurrence of a hazard. 
The failure probabilities given that the hazard occurs or does not occur are assumed to be 
1´10-2 or 1´10-4, respectively. The hazard in the example is generalized and could, e.g., 
represent a storm. The equal prior failure probabilities across components results in ranking 
and component prioritization rather than obtaining specific failure probability values. If 
more information is learned about the components, the failure probabilities can be easily 
updated as inputs to the model. 
4.4 Dimensionality Reduction 
Running Algorithm A for the full system identifies the MLSs from a supply node to 
each of the transshipment and distribution nodes in the network. This takes approximately 
2.19 seconds on a computer with 4 GB RAM and 1.3 GHz Intel Core i5 processor using 
MATLAB 2017b for the entire network. There are 246 MLSs in the full system. The 
maximum number of MLSs for a component is five components and the maximum length 
of an MLS is 17 components. An example set of MLSs for node C7 is: 
÷C108, C58, C59, C7C108, C60, C59, C7ø 
where the first component in each row is a supply node and the middle nodes are on the 
path to the final node. Super-components were not needed for this example. 
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4.5 Defining Interdependencies 
The interdependencies modeled in the application are service provision and 
geographic. Service provision interdependencies are based on information provided by the 
owners of the water network. There are power substations located at each of the water 
supply stations. To model the service provision interdependencies, direct links are added 
from each power substation to the water supply node that it supplies. Backup generators 
can also be incorporated to account for continued power in the case of an outage of a main 
substation. There is a total of seven power substations in the network at the same locations 
as their corresponding water supply components that provide power to seven water supply 
nodes. 
The water and power networks are partitioned into hazard zones that are used to 
represent geographic interdependencies. These hazard zones also represent service areas 
surrounding each of the water supply nodes. The seven zone partitions for the network are 




Figure 7. Service areas partitioned by zone for application network. 
 
Two of the service areas are split into two groups heuristically for ease of 
computation during inference. Therefore, in total, there are nine partitions with hazard 
nodes as parents for the nodes in each of them.  
4.6 Interdependent Adjacency Matrix Construction 
The next step is to build the interdependent adjacency matrix from identified MLSs 
and interdependency relationships between nodes. Each MLS is a parent of its dependent 
component node, and the components that comprise the MLS are parents of the MLS node. 
Links created by service provision interdependencies include defined parent and dependent 
children nodes. Geographic interdependency links include those from a hazard node to 
each component in the hazard zone, as well as links from each distribution component in a 
zone to the service level nodes used for posterior inference. There are 1,868 parent-child 
N
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Thousand Feet
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relationships defined in the adjacency matrix for the network of 112 components and 244 
links. The Bayes Nets Toolbox (Murphy, 2001) is used to construct and perform inference 
in MATLAB. This toolbox requires the components to be sorted topologically from parent 
to child nodes. The sorting and construction of the adjacency matrix takes approximately 
1.26 seconds. 
4.7 Accounting for Cycles 
Defining all MLSs and parent-child relationships for the example system creates 52 
cycles in the network. A graph traverse algorithm is applied to first identify these cycles 
and then remove one of the links from a component to a MLS for each cycle. This removes 
the cycles from the network in a negligible amount of time. 
4.8 Defining Conditional Probability Tables 
Overall, the definition of conditional probabilities takes about 62.6 seconds. This 
builds CPTs for each of the 392 nodes in the BN. The minimum CPT size is 2 × 1 for 
hazard nodes. For nodes with 𝑛 parents, the size of the CPT is 2 × 2 × (𝑛 + 1).  
4.8.1 Geographic Interdependency Nodes 
The probability that a hazard occurs is assumed to be 0.01. This is for a generalized 
hazard and can be changed to the probability of occurrence of any specific hazard of 










Cúý	includes all transshipment and distribution components in zone 1. The CPT in the 
above example is 2 × 2 × 13.  
4.8.2 Supply Components 
The CPT for an example supply component, C108, is shown in Table 5. In Table 5, 
H& indicates the hazard in its zone partition and R and RÊ are the two power substations 
that supply C108. S and F denote survival and failure, respectively, of the substations. 
 
Table 5. CPT for example supply component, C108. 
C108 
H& Occurs H& Does not occur 
R S R F R S R F 
RÊ S RÊ F RÊ S RÊ F RÊ S RÊ F RÊ S RÊ F 
Survives 0.99 0.99 0.99 0 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0 
Fails 0.01 0.01 0.01 1 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 1 
 
4.8.3 Transshipment and Distribution Components 
The CPT for an example transshipment or distribution component, C99, is shown in 
Table 6. In Table 6, H( indicates the hazard in its zone partition. For this example, 
component C99 has only one MLS parent. S and F denote survival and failure, respectively, 
of the MLS.  
 68 
Table 6. CPT for example distribution component, C99. 
C99 H( Occurs H( Does not occur MLS)&&ýS MLS)&&ýF MLS)&&ýS MLS)&&ýF 
Survives 0.99 0 0.9999 0 
Fails 0.01 1 0.0001 1 
 
4.8.4 Minimum Link Set Nodes 
An example of the CPT for a non-cyclic MLS, MLS)*+ý , is shown in Table 7, where 
C,-./01ýý is C111 and C,-./01ý2 is C91; these are the two nodes that comprise MLS)*+ý .  
 
Table 7. CPT for example non-cyclic MLS, 𝐌𝐋𝐒𝐂𝟕𝟎𝟏. 
𝐌𝐋𝐒𝐂𝟕𝟎𝟏 
C,-./01ýýS C,-./01ýýF 
C,-./01ý2S C,-./01ý2F C,-./01ý2S C,-./01ý2F 
Survives 1 0 0 0 
Fails 0 1 1 1 
 
An example of the CPT for a cyclic MLS, MLS)334 , is shown in Table 8. In this 
example, the link that is removed is from C3 to MLS)334 . Therefore, the remaining parent 
of MLS)334  is C,-./554ý, which represents C110. The probability that C3 survives is 




Table 8. CPT for example cyclic MLS, 𝐌𝐋𝐒𝐂𝟔𝟔𝟑. 
𝐌𝐋𝐒𝐂𝟔𝟔𝟑 C,-./554ýS C,-./554ýF 
Survives P(C3 Survives) 0 
Fails 1 – P(C3 Survives) 1 
 
4.9 Output 
Figure 8 shows the overall BN model. The hazard nodes are denoted Hazard, …, 
Hazard&. These are parents of the power and water components and represent the 
geographic interdependency. The power supply components are denoted Power	Supply, 
…, Power	Supply*. These are parents of water supply components – representing service 
provision connections. Water supply components are denoted Water	Supply, …, 
Water	Supply*, and water distribution components Water	Distribution, …, 
Water	Distribution+8. Water distribution components are parents of zones partitions 
Zone, …, Zone&, which represent levels of service throughout the network. Both water 
supply and distribution components are parents of MLSs denoted Water	MLS, …, 
Water	MLSÊ93. MLSs are parents of the distribution components that they supply. The 
subscripts represent the number of nodes of each type in the network; the BN comprises 































CHAPTER 5. VALIDATION FOR INTERDEPENDENT 
INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORKS WITH APPLICATION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a validation of the use of the framework including both 
external and internal validation using the model of Atlanta’s infrastructure networks as the 
illustrative example. The chapter starts with external validation including assessing the 
accuracy of the model using a real-world scenario. Then, internal validation is provided 
with other applications of the interdependent BN model and example inferences for 
specific scenarios. 
5.2 External Validation 
The accuracy of the model is validated using a real-world scenario of cascading 
failures due to the interdependent nature of infrastructure networks that occurred in both 
2014 and 2017. In these instances, a water pump station lost power from both of its dual 
feeds and caused outages throughout Atlanta’s downtown area. The water system lost 
pressure in both cases and a boil water advisory became necessary. To test the scenario 
with the model, an outage was simulated to the power components supplying the affected 
pump station. The resulting network showed outages throughout the downtown area, as 
shown in Figure 9. This is consistent with the outcomes of the event where the downtown 
area lost water pressure. The loss of water pressure is used as an indicator for failure at the 
distribution level in the example. The BN model includes the complexities of the 
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functionality and interdependencies of the networks and shows the effects of the outage 
directly. 
 
Figure 9. Atlanta outage scenario for validation. 
 
5.3 Internal Validation 
With the BN model built, varying inferences can be conducted over the networks. 
The external validation scenario above is an example of assessing the impacts of a service 
provision interdependency, where the power supply of a water pump station failed and 






probabilistic vulnerability analyses include assessing the impacts of a hazard occurring in 
a specific zone – a geographic interdependency – or evaluating the effects of failures within 
the water system itself. 
Figure 10 shows inference results from a hazard occurring in hazard zones 1 and 2. 
The gradient on the right represents failure probabilities. Hazard zones 1 and 2 are in the 
upper right corner of the system, so it is observed that components in that area experience 
increased probabilities of failure. As the supply nodes are distributed throughout the rest 
of the network, no additional outages are experienced due to this event scenario. 
 
 





Another example of inference is to assess the effects of an observed outage or failure 
of a specific component in the network. Inference over the BN will update the failure 
probabilities of all nodes throughout the network. Figure 11 shows the results from learning 
that a large supply component in the bottom right area of the network has failed. The effects 
of such an outage depict the ability to provide service in that part of the network. 
 
 
Figure 11. Inference results from supply node failure. 
 
These inferences performed highlight the abilities of the proposed framework. The 
results shown are a small subset of information that can be gained from the built 
interdependent infrastructure model. The models allow a user to input information across 
Failed supply node
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a wide range of possible scenarios, e.g., outages that are experienced or expected; hazard 
occurrences; or updated information on a component such as failure, retrofit, or 
replacement. The user can then visualize and observe the updated probabilities of failure 
in components throughout the network. The above inferences were performed in 
approximately 4 seconds each. The output is achieved in a computationally efficient 
manner and is based on a full representation of the network, including the performance of 
its constituent individual components and the interdependencies that exist across systems. 
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CHAPTER 6. COMPONENT IMPORTANCE MEASURES WITH 
APPLICATION 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides an overview of the centrality-based, reliability-based, and 
combination component importance measures that are applied to the example Atlanta water 
distribution system and its dependencies on power. A comparison of the five metrics is 
provided in Section 6.3, as well as an assessment of the impact that considering 
dependencies when ranking component criticality has in Section 6.4. 
6.2 Critical Component Identification 
To demonstrate the proposed component importance measures, they are applied to 
the interdependent water and power distribution networks in Atlanta, Georgia. Degree 
centrality, MLS appearances, RAW, and the two combination metrics are applied to the 
water system alone and to the interdependent water and power systems. Section 6.4 
includes a discussion of the effect of considering interdependencies on the component 
importance rankings. 
6.2.1 Centrality-Based Metric – Degree Centrality 
Degree centrality for the networks is calculated by summing the number of 
connections for each component. More connections represent nodes with higher degree 
thus, lower rankings and higher criticality. The water system is first analyzed on its own. 
In this analysis, the top three most critical nodes are water supply components. Specifically, 
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supply nodes S3, S5, and S6 are each connected to five other nodes in the network. The 
system is then analyzed including the dependencies on power to see how the rankings 
change. The water supply components increase in importance with a higher maximum 
degree now of six, with supply components S3, S5, and S6 remaining the most critical. In 
comparison, fifty nodes have a degree of one, including all of the power nodes.  
The system is then analyzed without the power components to see how rankings 
change without consideration of interdependencies. In the analysis, water supply 
components decrease in importance with a lower maximum degree now of five. Supply 
components S3, S5, and S6 have a degree of five and remain the most critical.  
To assess the impact of interdependencies on rankings of component criticality, 
Figure 12 and Figure 13 show the degree rankings with and without consideration of 
interdependencies. Figure 12 plots the rankings with consideration of interdependencies as 
squares and without consideration of interdependencies as circles on the y-axis. The 
components are ordered on the x-axis by their ranking when interdependencies are 
considered. The background of the plot for each component indicates the component type. 
The white background represents water distribution nodes. The lightest gray represents 
water transshipment nodes. The darker gray represents water supply nodes. The darkest 
background represents power components. Components with lower rankings (i.e., 1-5) are 
more critical than components with higher rankings. Figure 13 displays the component 
rankings on the layout of the network. The darkest color represents the most critical nodes. 
Figure 13(a) shows rankings with consideration of interdependencies and Figure 13(b) 
represents rankings without consideration of interdependencies. In some cases, more 
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critical nodes are covered by less critical nodes, such as S3 and S6 in Figure 13(a). While 
the components appear a lighter color, they are covered by a less critical node in the plot. 
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In calculating degree centrality, many components have a degree of three or one in 
the network. This is typical for infrastructure networks designed in a branching topological 
structure or for end-point distribution nodes, respectively. Therefore, as seen in Figure 12, 
many components have a similar ranking. In fact, for the entire network, there are only five 
different ranking levels. Thus, degree centrality should not be used on its own to prioritize 
infrastructure investment, as it is necessary to further distinguish between component 
criticality beyond a few coarse levels. 
6.2.2 Centrality-Based Metric – MLS Appearances 
The number of MLS appearances for a component is calculated by summing the 
number of MLSs for which each node is a part. Lower rankings represent nodes with more 
MLS appearances, and are therefore more critical. The maximum number of MLS 
appearances is 74 and the minimum is zero. As MLSs represent flow from supply nodes to 
distribution nodes, power components are not included in the MLSs, so have the lowest 
importance based on MLS appearances. For this reason, the rankings without consideration 
of interdependencies are the same as those with consideration of interdependencies, 
excluding the power components. Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the rankings using the 
number of MLS appearances ordered by component importance and on the layout of the 








 (a)                              (b) 
Figure 15. Network with MLS Appearances rankings with (a) and without (b) 












Water Distribution Water Transshipment Water Supply Power Supply With & Without Interdependencies




























From Figure 14, number of MLS appearances provides a larger variation in 
component importance rankings than degree centrality. However, with only the 
consideration of number of flow paths from supply components to distribution 
components, these rankings do not consider dependencies on power for the water system 
or the reliability of individual components. Therefore, this measure cannot be used on its 
own to assess component criticality in interdependent infrastructure networks 
6.2.3 Reliability-Based Metric – Risk Achievement Worth 
The interval-scale RAW measure is used to rank component criticality including 
individual component reliabilities. First, prior probabilities of failure are calculated for 
each component based on the BN model constructed. Then, inference is performed to 
calculate each RAW value by updating the network with a 100% probability of failure for 
that component. The probabilities of failure of every other component are then calculated. 
An aggregate RAW is calculated by summing the changes in failure probability for each 
component. For example, the RAW of component D1 is calculated by indicating that 
component D1 has a 100% probability of failure. The updated probabilities of failure of all 
components (D2 to D105, S1 to S7, and P1 to P7) are then calculated using the BN. The 
changes in probabilities of failure are then calculated by subtracting the new probabilities 
of failure from the prior probabilities of failure for each component. The final RAW of 
component D1 is the sum of the changes in probabilities of failure of all other components. 
Components with lower rankings have a higher RAWs have lower rankings and therefore 
higher criticality. 
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Figure 16 plots the rankings from RAW with and without consideration of 
interdependencies. Components are ordered by their rankings with interdependencies. 
Figure 17(a) shows the rankings from RAW with consideration of interdependencies on a 
graph of the network. Again, the darker circles represent higher criticality. Dispersion 
represents the change in ranking for a component with and without consideration of 
dependence on power. Figure 17(b) shows the rankings of components using RAW without 
consideration of interdependencies.  
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 (a)                              (b) 
Figure 17. Network with RAW rankings with (a) and without (b) consideration of 
interdependencies. 
 
The top four most critical components when dependencies on power are considered 
are water supply components S4 and S6 and their corresponding power supplies, P4 and 
P6. When RAW rankings are calculated without consideration of dependencies on power, 
water supply S6 is the most critical node, but S4 has moved to the 24th most critical node. 
The RAW value of both S6 and S4 are similar with and without consideration of 
dependence on power. However, there is a small range in RAW values when dependence 
on power is not considered. The maximum difference in RAW values between the top 24 
most critical components is approximately 9%. The other nodes with the highest criticality 
when dependence on power is not considered are transshipment nodes. The second most 
critical node becomes D38, with an increased RAW value of approximately 50% from the 
interdependency case. Each of the transshipment nodes that are the second to ninth most 
critical without consideration of dependence on power are relatively close to supply 


























components: six of the components are one link away from a supply, one is two links away, 
and one is three links away. Since updates to a component state in the BN model propagate 
both to the children and parents of the node, evidence of failure of each of these 
transshipment components increases the probability of failure of the supply nodes included 
in the MLSs. Here, RAW captures the secondary effects from supply to transshipment 
nodes compared to the importance of the supply nodes themselves as in the 
interdependency case. In these rankings, RAW is useful in that it accounts for component-
level reliabilities. However, RAW gives a less direct weight on the importance of topology 
in component importance rankings. It is therefore recommended that RAW be combined 
with a centrality-based metric to directly account for topology as well. 
6.2.4 Proposed Combination Metrics 
Considering the limitations of using degree centrality, MLS appearances, or RAW 
on their own to assess component importance, two combination metrics are proposed and 
analyzed to include both centrality-based and reliability-based attributes. 
6.2.4.1 Degree and RAW Combination Metric 
The first combination metric assessed is combining degree with RAW both with and 
without consideration of interdependencies. Figure 18 and Figure 19 show the rankings 








 (a)                              (b) 
Figure 19. Network with Degree + RAW rankings with (a) and without (b) 
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Two of the most critical components when dependencies on power are considered 
are supply nodes S5 and S6. However, S4 moves from third to 54th most critical when 
dependence on power is not considered. S6 is the most critical component in rankings using 
both degree and RAW with and without consideration of dependence on power, showing 
consistent results with the individual degree and RAW rankings. Power supply components 
range from the eighth most critical (P6) to the 92nd most critical (P1). All of the water 
supply components are more critical when dependencies on power are considered 
compared to when they are not, with the exception of S6, which remains the most critical. 
This is also consistent with the RAW rankings individually. As supply nodes are necessary 
to deliver resources to transshipment and distribution nodes, this supports the 
recommendation in this study to consider interdependencies when prioritizing 
maintenance, repair, and retrofit decisions. 
6.2.4.2 MLS Appearances and RAW Combination Metric 
The last metric assessed is weighting RAW by the number of MLSs in which each 
component appears with and without consideration of dependencies on power. Figure 20 
and Figure 21 show the ranking of components with and without consideration of 








 (a)                              (b) 
Figure 21. Network with MLS Appearances + RAW rankings with (a) and without 












Water Distribution Water Transshipment Water Supply





































Components S4 and S6 are the most critical based on this metric when dependencies 
on power are and are not considered. S4 does not move down in rankings as with RAW 
alone when dependence on power is removed because it is one of the most critical 
components by MLS appearances. Even though they appear in no MLSs, the relatively 
high RAW values of the power components mean that they maintain their criticality in the 
combination metric rankings. If more information were available about the power system 
and its connectivity, this combination metric would be the most appropriate because it 
accounts for component reliability and MLS appearances representing a wide range of 
component connectivity. I.e., information on the power network would account for 
redundancies in power supply to the water network, capturing criticality within the power 
system while not creating redundancies with the water supply components. 
6.3 Comparison of Metrics 
In the previous sections, the outcomes of component criticality rankings for the 
connected water and power networks in Atlanta were shown. Component importance was 
assessed using three individual metrics and two combination metrics. Intuitively, water 
supply nodes should be more critical than distribution nodes, e.g., distribution nodes will 
not be able to provide service if supplies are out. In the assessment of infrastructure 
interdependencies, the connections between the water and power nodes are critical. 
Therefore, to assess how the types of nodes vary in assessed importance based on the 
measure used, Table 9 shows a summary of the results based on component type of water 
supply nodes and power supply nodes. The top five most critical nodes using each metric 
are also provided. The transshipment and distribution nodes are ranked in the top five using 
each of the metrics are in close proximity to supply components, as described in section 
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6.2.3. The failure of these nodes increases the updated probabilities of failure of their 
surrounding supply components. 
 
Table 9. Comparison of component importance metrics with consideration of 
interdependencies. 
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Water and power supply components are necessary to provide water throughout the 
remaining components in the network. Therefore, the results for these components are used 
as a means to make recommendations for a useful and accurate metric to rank component 
criticality. The two centrality-based metrics, degree and MLS appearances, rank power 
components the least critical because of their topology. Degree is based on the number of 
connections a component has, and power components only have a single connection to the 
water components they supply. Power components are not included in MLSs, so they are 
ranked the least critical using the number of MLS appearances. For that reason, it is 
suggested in this study that neither of these measures alone should be used to assess 
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component criticality. Each of these approaches includes similar distribution components 
in the most critical nodes. For example, each of the metrics includes distribution node D60 
in the top 5 most critical nodes. D60 is one link away from S4, with S4 being one of two 
of D60’s connections. Therefore, it lies on many paths between other nodes and supply 
node, S4.  
When looking at only RAW values, two water supply components and their 
corresponding power supply components are ranked as the four most critical nodes in the 
network. A power component causes a 100% probability of failure of its corresponding 
water supply component. The power component is only critical in the network insofar as it 
affects the water supply component. Therefore, there is a redundancy in the component 
importance rankings when both the power supply and water supply components are 
indicated as the most critical based on RAW alone. Combining RAW with the centrality-
based metrics eliminates the redundancy while accounting for other attributes of 
component criticality. 
For the application water system and its dependencies on power, the Degree + RAW 
combination metric is recommended to best assess the component criticality. This measure 
captures the topology of the network through degree centrality as well as the reliability of 
individual components through RAW.  
To further assess the outcomes of using the Degree + RAW combination metric 
compared to the RAW metric alone, the differences in rankings between the two are shown 
in Figure 22. Diamonds represent the difference in ranking between using Degree + RAW 
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and RAW. In the plot, negative values indicate that the component is more critical using 
the combination metric compared to the RAW metric alone. 
 
 
Figure 22. Comparison of rankings between Degree + RAW and RAW. 
 
All of the power components have a positive difference between the combination 
metric and RAW, indicating that they are more critical using the RAW metric by itself. 
However, the water supply components are generally more critical using the combination 
metric. Water supply components are intuitively highly critical, as they are required to 
provide the resource that is then delivered through the network. At the same time, the RAW 
rankings include the unwanted redundancy between the power components and their 
corresponding water supply components. This highlights the importance of using a 








To assess how the rankings change for components of varying characteristics, the 
differences in rankings between the combination Degree + RAW metric and the RAW 
metric alone is also compared to the component’s number of connections. This is shown in 
Figure 23, where points represent the change in ranking of a component on the x-axis and 
the number of connections of the component on the y-axis.  
 
 
Figure 23. Comparison of change in ranking from Degree + RAW to RAW and 
number of connections. 
 
This plot shows a negative relationship between the degree and change in ranking, 
meaning that, as expected, components with more connections increase in criticality with 
the combination metric. Previous studies have found centrality-based measures such as 
number of connections to be important indicators of component criticality. The results from 
using the combination metric demonstrate its ability to account for the centrality-based 
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attributes of the components that the RAW metric alone does not capture. The R2 value 
between the change in ranking and the number of connections is 0.5117. This is affected 
by two outliers, S2 and S6, which have many connections but little change in ranking. 
These are two water supply components that remain critical in both the combination metric 
and RAW alone rankings 
6.4 Impact of Interdependencies 
To quantitatively assess the impact of interdependencies on component ranking, the 
change in both the values of the metrics and the ranking for each component is assessed 
with and without consideration of dependencies of the water system on the power network. 
The change is calculated as the difference between the metric value or ranking with 
consideration of the power network and the corresponding value or ranking without 
consideration of power. In assessing how the value of the metric changes, for each of the 
metrics, a higher value indicates a larger change in the metric from including 
interdependencies. Components with a positive difference in the component importance 
measure value are more critical when the power network is included and components with 
a negative difference in the measure are more critical when the power network is not 
included. The opposite is true in assessing the impact of interdependencies on component 
rankings. Components with a positive difference in rank are more critical without power 





6.4.1 Degree Centrality 
For degree centrality, the change in the degree of each node with and without 
including dependence on power results in either zero or one. This is shown in Figure 
24Figure 24. Change in degree with and without consideration of dependencies on power. 
The same convention for background colors used in the previous plots is used here. 
Diamonds represent the change in degree for each node. All of the transshipment and 
distribution nodes have no change in degree. The water supply nodes each have a change 
in degree of one when the connection to a power component is removed from the system 
studied. Four supply nodes (S1, S2, S4, and S7) move down the most in criticality when 
interdependencies are excluded from the analysis. These four water supply nodes have one 
to two connections compared to the five links of the other water supply nodes. S3, S5, and 
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6.4.2 MLS Appearances 
Rankings by MLS appearances are exactly the same with and without consideration 
of dependence on power because power components are not included in MLSs. If more 
information were learned about the power distribution system, a more robust network could 
be developed that also includes MLSs for the power system. In this case, it is likely that 
power components would move up in the component criticality rankings. 
6.4.3 RAW 
RAW values are compared with and without consideration of interdependencies as 
shown in Figure 25. Most components have a negative difference in the RAW value from 
the network with consideration of power compared to without consideration of power. I.e., 
most of the components in the network contribute to a larger increase in system failure 
probability in the case of their failure when power components are not included in the BN, 
compared to when power components are included in the BN.  
Conversely, all of the water supply components have a positive change in RAW 
value, meaning that they contribute more to an increase in system failure probability in the 
case of their failure when power is considered as opposed to when power is not considered. 
The increase in RAW is due to increases in failure probabilities of water supply 
components given power component failures, as well as to increased updated power 
component failure probabilities in the interdependent case. If a water supply component 
has failed, its parent power component has an increased probability of failure as the BN 
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model updates the distributions of its parent nodes. For this reason, all of the water supply 
components move down in criticality in the network without power dependencies with the 
exception of one supply component, S6, which remains at the same rank. The top ten most 




Figure 25. Change in RAW with and without consideration of dependencies on power. 
 
Table 10. Top Ten RAW Rankings With and Without Consideration of 
Interdependencies. 
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6.4.4 Degree and RAW Combination Metric 
For the first combination metric using degree and RAW, most of the distribution and 
transshipment components have a negative difference in the measure as shown in Figure 
26. I.e., most of the components contribute to a larger increase in system failure probability 
when they are assumed to have failed with consideration of interdependencies compared 
to without consideration of interdependencies. In contrast, all of the water supply 
components have a positive change in the degree and RAW metric. This is consistent with 
the RAW metric alone as well as degree alone. As supply components are critical to provide 
the resource that flows through the network to distribution components, this shows the 
importance of considering interdependencies when prioritizing repair, retrofit, or 
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Table 11. Top Ten Degree + RAW Rankings With and Without Consideration of 
Interdependencies. 












6.4.5 MLS Appearances and RAW Combination Metric 
For the metric combining MLS appearances and RAW, 85 of the components have 
negative differences in the MLS and RAW metric as shown in Figure 27. Most of the water 
supply components have a slight positive change in the measure, with the exception of S7, 
which has no change. Two water supply components, S4 and S6, have the most positive 
change measure, indicating that they are more critical when dependence on power is 
considered. Again, this highlights the importance of considering interdependencies when 
prioritizing maintenance and repair as water supply components are critical in maintaining 
flow through a network. The top ten rankings with and without considering 




Figure 27. Change in MLS Appearances + RAW with and without consideration of 
dependencies on power. 
 
Table 12. Top Ten MLS Appearances + RAW Rankings With and Without 
Consideration of Interdependencies. 












6.5 Component Importance Ranking for Resilience 
Analyses using the framework show the effects of individual component 
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that exist between infrastructure systems. Understanding the effects of the 
interdependencies on the fragility of the systems supports decision making in their design, 
management, and restoration to create more resilient critical infrastructure. 
The model is useful before a hazard occurs to assess where the greatest extent of 
damage is possible and where to invest resources to prevent large outages. For example, 
infrastructure owners and decision makers can use the component criticality rankings to 
prioritize where the most immediate inspections should occur to determine if the most 
critical components are prepared for a hazard. The model is useful during a hazard to 
determine where to disperse resources and repair crews to bring the most customers or the 
most critical customers back online as quickly as possible. An emergency manager can 
input outages and dispatch crews and resources to the most vulnerable areas and zones with 
critical facilities. Finally, the model is useful after a hazard to prioritize components for 
interventions to prevent similar incidents and impacts from occurring again in the future. 
If an infrastructure operator observes cascading failures or other large outages, they can 
allocate resources to reinforce areas of vulnerability or create redundancies to prevent those 
failures in the future. Those repair and reinforcement actions can be added to the model to 
analyze the potential effects throughout the interdependent network. 
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CHAPTER 7. ALGORITHMIC PERFORMANCE 
7.1 Introduction 
One of the key contributions of this work is to provide computationally tractable 
probabilistic modeling of interdependent infrastructure systems. To demonstrate the 
performance of the proposed algorithms, this chapter provides a comparison of the 
computation time and accuracy of the framework versus prior approaches. These include 
MLS enumeration, BN modeling, and a comparison to Monte Carlo simulation for the same 
example system. 
7.2 Performance Comparison to Prior Approaches 
7.2.1 MLS Enumeration 
To further assess performance of the proposed methodology, it is compared to that 
of prior approaches in several steps of the framework. The MLS enumeration takes 2.19 
seconds using the proposed method. An algorithm has been developed to enumerate the 
complement to MLSs, MCSs by Mishra, Saifi, and Chaturvedi (2016). This is used as a 
comparison metric for the MLS enumeration algorithm. In the previous study, the authors 
propose an algorithm to identify MCSs that uses the connectivity matrix of a graph to check 
the connection between nodes in a network as nodes are progressively removed. The largest 
system that this algorithm was tested on in the study contained 21 nodes and 26 links. The 
enumeration of the MCSs took approximately 2,600 seconds. This is over 1,000 times 
longer for a network that is approximately five times smaller than the application used in 
this study. The MLS formulation presented allows expansion of the number of components 
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that are included in the network with increased computational efficiency compared to other 
methods of identifying minimum sets in a network. 
7.2.2 BN Model 
Prior approaches to modeling interdependent infrastructure systems using BNs have 
focused on network characteristics at the global level rather than including system 
topologies from the component level to study system reliability and prioritize repair and 
retrofit for components. Therefore, inference examples in this dissertation are not 
comparable to works such as Aung & Watanabe (2010) and Di Giorgio & Liberati (2011). 
A BN approach without the MLS formulation is explored by Schaberreiter et al. (2013). 
However, the study is applied to a system of four infrastructure component nodes and four 
service nodes. The approach is not scalable to infrastructure systems of the scale used in 
the application. 
7.2.3 BN Inference 
Finally, the performance of the proposed methodology is compared to results from 
Monte Carlo simulation. Samples of probabilities of failure for each component were 
selected based on hazard occurrence using the same probabilities as described in the 
application for the proposed model. The probability of failure of each component given 
that the hazard occurs is 10ËÊ and the probability of failure given that the hazard does not 
occur is 10Ë9. The failure or survival of each component was used to update the survival 
or failure of each MLS. These updated MLSs were then used to update the survival or 
failure of the nodes that depend on them. The outcome was the probability of survival of 
each component node. The Monte Carlo was performed using 103, 104, 105, 106, and 107 
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Figure 28. Comparison of results from proposed methodology to Monte Carlo 
simulations. 
 
The solid circles represent the probabilities of survival of each component calculated 
using the proposed framework. These are the exact solutions. The open diamonds, circles, 
squares, and triangles represent the probabilities obtained from 103, 104, 105, and 106 
simulations, respectively, with ×s representing results from 107 simulations. To compare 
the error in Monte Carlo Simulation, two smaller conditional probabilities of failure were 
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hazard and 10Ë3 given no hazard. The third set of failure probabilities is 10Ë3 given a 
hazard and 10Ë: given no hazard. The computation times required for each method and 
the average percent errors over all components are shown in Table 13.  
 


























0% 100% 100% 98.58% 81.59% 79.40% 
 
As expected for Monte Carlo, the error decreases with an increase in the number of 
simulations. However, the average errors decrease slowly for the probabilities of failure of 
10ËÊ and 10Ë9 as the orders of magnitude of the numbers of simulations increase. The 
computation time for 107 simulations was much higher than the proposed approach and 
also required a large amount of memory, a 112 × 10* matrix representing the state of each 
component for every simulation. Results from the simulation approach do not capture the 
small differences in failure probabilities that the exact solutions obtained using the 
proposed method give. The errors are significant given the importance of detailed 
granularity in the probabilities of survival in the results, particularly if they are used to rank 
component criticality in the interdependent network. When small probabilities of failure 
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are assessed, such as 10Ë9 and 10Ë3, errors increase in magnitude. These probabilities of 
failure are reasonable for many infrastructure components that are not experiencing 
increased demands given a hazard. 
7.3 Summary of Performance Measures 
Table 14 shows a summary of the time taken to compute each of the above steps of 
the framework as well as the amount of memory required. Through participating in the 
National Science Foundation’s Innovation-Corps program, time taken and memory 
requirements were found to be useful performance metrics for infrastructure owners. 
Additional measures such as amount of money saved through implementing actions 
recommended by the analyses would also be useful. Through speaking to over 100 people 
in the utility industry, the addition of consideration of external dependencies would be 
beneficial in their existing methods to determine which components to invest in for repair, 
maintenance, and addition of redundant paths. 
Table 14. Summary of time and memory requirements. 
 Input MLS Enumeration 
BN 
Construction BN Inference 
Time 
(seconds) ------ 2.19 88.66 4.00 
Memory 
 1.3 MB 2 KB 995 KB --------------- 
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CHAPTER 8. FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an outline of future work that can be expanded upon from this 
work including application of the framework to capacitated networks, development of 
quantified resilience metrics, and application of the framework to macro-scale 
infrastructure systems. 
8.2 Application to Capacitated Networks 
The MLS formulation described in this dissertation is connectivity-based and does 
not account for flow through or capacity of a system. Rather, the focus is on connectivity 
of the nodes in the network. Other MLS formulations, such as the max-flow min-cut 
theorem, can be explored to capture the flow between supply and distribution nodes and 
allow for more detailed analysis of capacitated networks. 
Incorporation of directionality and capacity in the network would require updates to 
the definition of CPTs in the framework. Rather than representing components as binary 
(i.e., either surviving or failing), components would be represented as continuous, where 
states would represent the level of flow throughout the node. The CPT for each component 
would represent the probability of maintaining a flow level given the states of parent nodes, 




8.3 Quantification of Interdependent Infrastructure Resilience 
Several prior studies have proposed methods to quantify the resilience of single 
infrastructure systems. A review of these proposed methods is provided in Hosseini, 
Barker, and Ramirez-Marquez (2016). However, these measures do not account for 
interdependencies between infrastructure systems. This model can be expanded upon to 
measure the resilience of infrastructure systems while accounting for the complex 
interdependencies between the infrastructure systems.  
One option would be to simulate a hazard on the system and measure the proportion 
of components that fail in each service area. This would account for the preparation aspect 
of resilience. In response and recovery, the component importance rankings could be used 
to find a prioritized order of repair. A time dimension could be added to assess the results 
of specific recovery actions over time using a dynamic BN. Additionally, cost nodes could 
be added to account for the cost of repairing each node, in order to help optimize recovery 
actions. 
8.4 Application to Larger-Scale Infrastructure Systems 
The application of the framework to larger infrastructure systems can be assessed , 
including through investigations using the existing example network. The City of Atlanta 
provided data including pipes of one inch and above. The application in this study focused 
on pipes greater than or equal to 18 inches. To test the performance of the algorithm on a 
denser system, smaller pipes would be added for analysis. To assess the performance of 
the algorithm, one would assess the time and memory requirements of increasing numbers 
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of MLSs with potentially more components in each MLS, a larger interdependent 
adjacency matrix, definition of additional CPTs, and inference on the larger BN. 
As described previously, representative sub-BNs can be used to expand the BN to 
larger-scale systems. In the application provided in this study, for example, some nodes are 
compressed. To account for every possible node, sub-networks can be used to represent 
smaller groups of nodes. These sub-groups would then be connected to the network as a 
whole, so the entire network is still represented. Future work can also address how best to 




CHAPTER 9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the specific contributions of the study. 
9.2 Summary of Contributions 
This study describes the development and validation of a new framework to perform 
probabilistic vulnerability analyses of interdependent infrastructures. The proposed 
approach is presented, including algorithms to construct a BN model of the interdependent 
infrastructure systems. The method results in computationally efficient modeling and 
analysis of large infrastructure networks with exact inference possible over any number of 
system states. Inference over the network enables scenario-based analyses and 
prioritization from the component level for repair, replacement, or reinforcement decisions. 
This is useful to increase system resilience before a hazard occurs to assess where the 
greatest extent of damage is possible and where to invest resources to prevent large outages. 
The model is useful during a hazard to determine where to disperse resources and repair 
crews to bring the most customers or the most critical customers back online as quickly as 
possible. Finally, the model is useful after a hazard to prioritize components for 
interventions to prevent similar incidents and impacts from occurring again in the future.  
The BN formulation accounts for uncertainty within the system as well as the 
interdependencies between different infrastructure systems. In the example, dependence 
on power and geographic interdependencies are represented. More information on the 
connectivity and locations of components in the power network would allow for expansion 
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to two-way interdependencies. Uncertainties in both individual component failure 
probabilities and the probabilistic connections between components are included in the 
model. Compared to previous input-output-based methods (Leontief, 1951; Rose & 
Miernyk, 1989) requiring a large amount of data, only simple inputs of basic component 
characteristics of location, type, connectivity, and initial failure probabilities are required. 
Dimensionality reduction algorithms, including for minimum link set, super-component, 
and cycle identification, allow the model to include hundreds of component nodes while 
remaining computationally efficient without making any approximating assumptions. The 
proposed modeling approach and framework for analysis enables us to create more reliable 
and resilient networks by understanding where vulnerabilities in the system exist and the 
areas where investing resources will lead to the greatest improvements in predicted system 
outcomes.  
The model created is computationally tractable and scalable. Where prior work, such 
as Bobbio et al. (2001) and Kim (2011) can only be applied to small networks, the proposed 
work can be applied to much larger systems and sub-networks can be used to expand the 
model even further. I.e., sub-networks can be built to represent some portion of a larger 
network, such as part of the American electric grid, and then sub-networks can be 
connected to create a representative model on a macro-scale. Previous work has used BNs 
to model interdependent infrastructures at a global scale, such as Schaberreiter et al. (2013) 
where high-level system metrics are nodes in the BN and Aung & Watanabe (2010) where 
entire infrastructure sectors are nodes in the BN. In the proposed framework, systems are 
modeled from the component scale. This allows the importance of individual components 
to be assessed as opposed to prior work focusing only on identifying the most critical 
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infrastructure type. With the proposed modeling and assessment of interdependent 
infrastructure systems, the objective is to identify the most critical infrastructure 
components with consideration of interdependencies between systems. 
The impacts of interdependencies on analyses of component criticality are assessed 
using centrality-based and reliability-based component importance measures for 
interdependent infrastructure systems. Two centrality-based metrics, degree centrality and 
MLS appearances, and one reliability-based metric, RAW, are applied to an example water 
distribution system in Atlanta, Georgia, and its dependencies on power. Two combination 
metrics are proposed – Degree + RAW and MLS Appearances + RAW – to capture the 
importance of network topology on component importance as well as the reliability of the 
components themselves. Metrics are assessed for the system, including where water and 
power supply components lie in the rankings as well as other attributes of the critical 
components. Each of the rankings places some or most water supply components at or near 
the highest criticality. For the centrality-based metrics, power supply components, which 
affect the water supply nodes, are among the least critical in the rankings. This highlights 
the importance of considering individual component reliabilities in determining component 
criticality. The water supply components have higher criticality when dependence on 
power is considered compared to when power is not considered. Including the dependence 
results in identification of the importance of water supply components in the network.   
When RAW is considered by itself, water supply components and their 
corresponding power supply components appear side-by-side in the rankings. This can be 
redundant, as the power component’s outage will cause 100% probability of failure of the 
water supply component. The combination metrics are then useful to eliminate that 
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redundancy, while still accounting for the importance of the power components. The most 
appropriate metric in this application is the metric combining degree centrality and RAW. 
Because of its wide applicability if more information were known about the power 
network, the combination metric with MLS appearances and RAW would also be a 
beneficial metric for component importance ranking. These combination metrics build 
upon previous applications of centrality-based metrics on their own (e.g., Comfort & 
Haase, 2006; Stergiopoulos et al, 2015) and reliability-based metrics on their own (e.g., 
Oliveira, Mota De Sá, & Ferreira, 2014) to account for individual component reliability 
and give higher weight to the topology of the network. From the results, the combination 
metric accounts for nodes with a higher degree more than RAW alone, showing that the 
topology is explicitly considered when assessing component criticality. 
The rankings using each metric are compared when system interdependencies are 
included versus when they are not. Of the five metrics, four have different components in 
the top ten most critical nodes. This implies that when looking at the system as a whole 
with its exterior dependencies, new critical components may be revealed that are not 
highlighted when a component is considered only in its own system. Using many of the 
metrics in the application, water supply components typically increase in importance with 
consideration of dependence on power. Many transshipment components show greater 
changes in the value of the component importance measure when dependencies on power 
are considered. These components are generally in close proximity to supply components, 
and therefore lead to increases in updated failure probabilities of their surrounding supply 
components as well. 
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Infrastructure systems are inherently interdependent, but often considered on their 
own when maintenance decisions are made. Considerations of external dependencies are 
necessary in making decisions to repair, replace, and reinforce component to increase 
overall system performance and resilience. The methodology provided in this study enables 
the modeling of infrastructure systems and their complex interdependencies. It allows 
infrastructure decision makers to understand where vulnerabilities exist in their systems 
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